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THE ETHNIC QUESTION IN LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT
Lan Cao*
WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTAB ILITY. By Amy Chua.

New York: Doubleday. 2003. Pp. ix, 340. $26.
World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds
Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability, by Professor Amy Chua,1 is an
analytically complex narrative of contemporary ethnic violence in the
current era of globalization. Although such violence has historical
roots, according to Chua it has also been fueled by free-market forces
and democratization. The book is a forceful and provocative
indictment of the current U.S. policy of promoting and exporting
markets and democracy to developing and formerly communist,
market-transitional countries.
In her book, Professor Chua applies her thesis - that ethnicity,
global capitalism, and democracy are a volatile mix - to countries
such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Indonesia and Malaysia, Russia
and Zimbabwe, Venezuela and the former Yugoslavia. As different as
those countries are, they share a defining characteristic: the presence
of what she calls "market dominant minorities" among the majority
population - that is, minorities, such as the ethnic Chinese in
Southeast Asia, Indians and Lebanese in Africa, Jews in post-Soviet
Russia, the ethnic Kikuyu in Kenya, whose spectacular wealth and
"control" of the economy arouse deep resentment in the impoverished
majority. This majority views itself as the "true," "indigenous" native
whose mission is to retaliate against the economically dominant ethnic

* Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. - Ed. I thank Professors Donald
Horowitz, Alan Meese, William Van Alstyne, and Spencer Weber Waller for reading drafts
of this Review, and for providing critical comments. Professor Meese was particularly
generous with his time and was always willing to discuss the complex intricacies of antitrust
law with an antitrust novice such as myself. Thanks also to Professor Horowitz for sharing
his thoughts about ethnicity and ethnic conflicts with me. His nuanced and perceptive
treatment of this subject is an inspiration.
I presented earlier drafts of this Review at Brooklyn Law School and William and Mary
Law School, and thank participants for their suggestions. Thanks also to Meghan Hallock,
Bradley Henderson, Mugdha Kelka, Ryan Pedraza, and Jeff Reale for their research
assistance. This project received generous financial support from Dean Taylor Reveley at
William and Mary Law School.

1. Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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"outsider" and return the country to its "rightful" owners. This ill-will
is deep and historically rooted but for the most part controlled by
autocratic regimes.
Two phenomena, market liberalization and democracy, have
exacerbated and inflamed the situation. The introduction of laissez
faire capitalism into such environments has benefited those already
economically dominant; that is, the already-hated market-dominant
ethnic minority. Simultaneously, the spread of democracy, in the form
of universal suffrage and electoral politics, has allowed ethno
nationalist demagogues to catapult themselves into office by
exploiting majority rage against market-dominant minorities (p. 6). In
other words, markets allow an already-rich ethnic minority to get even
richer, and democracy allows the already-impoverished ethnic
majority to get even.
For Chua, the United States should therefore rethink its reflexive
exhortations, through the World Bank and the IMF, of markets and
democracy as panaceas for the developing world. As currently
promoted, "the global spread of markets and democracy is a principal,
aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the
non-Western world" (p. 9; emphasis added). Free markets plus
democracy in the presence of a market-dominant minority result in
backlash: backlash against markets because they represent the market
dominant minority's wealth; or backlash against democracy, by forces
with a vested interest in counteracting the country's democratic
impulses against markets; or violence directed against the market
dominant minority (p. 10).
The main solution for gross inter-ethnic inequality that Professor
Chua proposes is ethnically conscious capitalism designed to favor the
majority and restrain the ethnic minority. Because this ethnically
biased market intervention is perhaps the most controversial and
provocative point made in the book, I focus my Review on markets,
market-dominant minorities, and Chua's proposal to "directly address
the pressing, potentially explosive problems of ethnic resentment" (p.
266) by pursuing ethnically conscious market interventions.2
2. Although our approaches differ, both Chua and I assume ethnic conflicts exist
because of the market dominance of ethnic minorities. Neither Chua nor I focus on ways to
forestall the existence of ethnic conflicts through institutional designs that facilitate conflict
management and "intercommunal accommodation." Katharine Belmont et al., Institutional
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, in THE ARCHITECfURE OF DEMOCRACY 2
(Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002). For example, scholars have proposed arrangements such as
executive power-sharing, group autonomy, federalism and decentralization, and other forms
of electoral systems for ethnically divided societies as ways to enhance ethnic integration,
accommodation, or both. See id.; see also Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its
Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 51 (2003) (exploring forms of ethnic
accommodation in Africa). The other component of Chun's thesis - that democracy breeds
ethnic conflicts under specified conditions - has been critiqued elsewhere. See, e.g. , Tom
Ginsburg, Democracy, Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?, 22
BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 310, 326-34 (2004).
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Part I discusses Chua's thesis. Part II looks at how markets may be
effectively introduced into such ethnically volatile environments. It
critiques Chua's proposal favoring massive "affirmative action" for the
ethnic majority and explores other mechanisms, for example, culture
change, to address group attributes that may retard economic
development and antitrust laws to address, in an ethnically neutral
manner, external, structural problems such as monopolies, predation,
and vertical restraints. Part II also examines why market-dominant
minorities exist. Certainly, in cases such as South Africa and
Zimbabwe, their existence is due to brutal colonial exploitation. But in
other cases, market-dominant minorities are classic "middleman
minorities" whose prosperity is attributable to business networks and
informal but efficient capital markets based on common ethnic ties
and the group's reserve of social capital. Although Chua is less
interested in why certain groups are market dominant than in the
consequences resulting from their domination, understanding the
reasons behind that economic success is important in crafting an
appropriate solution. Part III concludes the Review and reiterates the
main argument against government-mandated, ethnically targeted
market interventions.
I.

MARKETS, DEMOCRACY, AND ETHNICITY: PROFESSOR CH U A'S
THESIS

Since the demise of communism, the West has viewed markets and
democracy as the antidote to poverty and authoritarianism throughout
the world. Professor Chua's sobering message, by contrast, is that in
many parts of the developing world, global markets and democracy two of America's most cherished values - breed not free trade and a
cosmopolitan citizenry but instead ethnic hatred and conflict. This is a
novel and bold challenge to the field of law and development. The
dominant school in law and development views development as a
modernization process consisting of relatively apolitical and
historically identifiable sequences, ultimately culminating in varying
forms of western, market-oriented, liberal democracies.3 Ideally,
development should occur in "a space beyond culture,"4 to shield

3. W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO 4-16 (3d ed. 1990). Rostow identified five sequences associated with
modernization: ( 1 ) the traditional society organized around agrarian subsistence; (2) pre
conditions for takeoff; (3) the takeoff, characterized by increased economic growth and
industrialization; (4) economic maturity, characterized by increased global integration; and
(5) high mass consumption, with consumption replacing subsistence. Id. at 12.
4. David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 9, 82 (1999).
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markets from culture5 as well as politics.6 As one scholar has aptly
observed about the prevailing tendency to depoliticize development,
"EU policy managers treat the transitional economies of Central
and Eastern Europe less as a set of political exclusions and choices
than as the technical management of different natural stages of
development. "7
Chua's book rightly rejects this apolitical view of development.
The book presents development as not merely a project of technical or
economic management involving the relatively straightforward
application of international trade rules or economic axioms but as a
political process embedded within a country's cultural, historical, and
political framework. Markets must be introduced with the
understanding that they are operating in a politicized environment,
especially for many developing countries where great disparities in
wealth exist and coincide with ethnic stratification. Chua insists that
although markets may indeed facilitate economic growth for the
developing country as a whole,8 distributional choices should be at the
forefront of the development debate.9 The book thus renounces the

5. Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 ,
80 (2000). Paul writes:
The whole legal structure of the free trade norm rests on a rational economic model. . . .
Cultural claims threaten that rationality argument. Cultural claims derive from sentiment,
nostalgia, insecurity; they are rooted in non-rationality. To protect the rationality of the
market from the non-rationality of nationalism and culture, the international community
rejects cultural exceptions.

Id.
6. David Kennedy has criticized this view. See David Kennedy, Background Noise? The
Underlying Politics of Global Governance, HARV. INT'L REV., Summer 1999, at 52
("Common but mistaken ideas - like the idea that international governance is separate
from both the global market and from local culture, or is more a matter of public than
private law - sharply narrow the sense among foreign-policy professionals of what is
possible and appropriate for foreign policy.").
7. Id. at 53.
8. Chua acknowledges that "[t]he extraordinary market-generated economic growth of
the 1980s and 1990s almost certainly left Indonesia's roughly 200-million-strong indigenous
(or primubi, 'of the soil') majority better off, at least in terms of average income." P. 43; see
also p. 56 ("Globalization has even produced some benefits for the indigenous majority."); p.
187 ("In absolute terms the majority may actually be marginally better off as a result of
markets . . . . "); p. 234 ("Global markets may well hold the key to long-term greater
prosperity for the poor and not-so-poor countries of the world."). Chua also writes:
As proponents of free markets correctly point out, global capitalism has, in certain
important respects, done wonders for the world, including many developing countries.
Global per capita income has tripled in the last thirty-five years. Technology has
transformed even small villages. Life expectancy and adult literacy rates have, on the whole,
increased significantly in the developing world. Global infant mortality rates are lower than
ever.
Pp.

0.

244-45.
9. Hirschman, too, emphasized the need to be wary of distributional conflicts, see Albert
Hirschman & Michael Rothschild, The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the
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prevailing understanding in the field, as epitomized by the
"Washington Consensus."10 There is no attempt in this book to reduce
development to an exercise of technical j udgments and expertise. This,
in itself, is a valuable contribution to the field of law and development.
A. Market-Dominant Minorities Around the World
Chua identifies country after country where an ethnic minority is
economically dominant over the impoverished ethnic majority and
analyzes how this crucial factor has a critical impact on the
development process. In Southeast Asia, for example, long before but
especially during the European colonial era, the ethnic Chinese
prevailed economically in Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia,
Vietnam, and Indonesia (pp. 23-48). In Latin America, a white elite
exists in countries such as Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,
Ecuador, and Peru. This elite is either Spanish-blooded "latifundistas"
whose wealth is derived from brutal colonial policies and plantation
farming or recent Christian Lebanese and Jewish immigrants who
have become the region's leading entrepreneurs (pp. 55-67).
In post-Soviet Russia, by exploiting the country's pro-market
reforms, specifically its mass privatization plans and "loans-for-shares"
deals, a group of industrialists and bankers succeeded in plundering
Russia and turning themselves into "billionaire-owners of Russia's
crown jewels while the country spiraled into chaos and lawlessness"
(p. 77). Six of the seven wealthiest oligarchs in Russia are Jewish,
while Jews make up less than one percent of the Russian population
(pp. 78-79).
In Africa, market-dominant minorities are indigenous Africans as
well as Indians, Lebanese, or former European colonizers. Angola,
Course of Economic Development, 87 Q.J. ECON. 544 (1973), but Chua has moved the
discussion by highlighting the fact that such conflicts run along ethnic lines.
10. Economist John Williamson, who coined the term, had argued in 1990 for a set of
policy reforms, particularly for Latin American countries, that could be set forth in ten
propositions: fiscal discipline; redirecting public expenditure priorities toward sectors with
high economic returns and improved income distribution, such as primary health care,
primary education, and infrastructure; tax reform to broaden the tax base; interest rate
liberalization; a competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; liberalization to attract
foreign direct investment; privatization; deregulation to abolish barriers to entry and exit;
secure property rights. John Williamson, What Should the Bank Think About the Washington
Consensus (July 1999), at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0799.htm; see
also JOHN WILLIAMSON, LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED?
(1990).
Another term for "Washington Consensus" has been coined by the economist Jagdish
Bhagwati: the "Wall Street-Treasury Complex." See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth:
The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1998, at 7,
10-12 (describing "a definite network of like-minded luminaries among the powerful
institutions - Wall Street, the Treasury Department, the State Department, the IMF, and
the World Bank . . . which may aptly, if loosely, be called the Wall Street-Treasury
Complex").
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Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa all have a market-dominant,
colonial-in-origin white minority. Kenya has the economically
successful Kikuyu who emerged from British rule "as a
disproportionately urban, 'capitalist' elite among Kenya's indigenous
tribes" (p. 105). The Ibo, known as the "Jews of Nigeria," are
economically dominant in Nigeria and around the world, where they
are deemed to be an unusually enterprising trader minority.11
The market dominance in Africa of non-indigenous ethnic
minorities is even more stark. In Kenya, despite the market
dominance of the Kikuyu, the country's largest corporations, banks,
and hotels are owned by roughly 70,000 Indians who constitute less
than two percent of the population.12 In West Africa, the Lebanese are
the economically preeminent minority (p. 119). By the early 1990s, the
Lebanese, with less than one percent of the population, dominated all
of the most productive economic sectors, from diamonds and gold, to
finance and retail, to construction and real estate. 13
B.

Global Markets and Backlashes

1.

Backlash Against Markets

By Chua's own acknowledgment, globalization has produced
benefits and opportunities, not just for the market-dominant minority
but also for the "indigenous" majority (pp. 30, 56). But globalization
has also increased economic disparities among ethnic groups as well as
the visibility of such disparities, resulting in intensified ethnic
resentment, increased ethnic consciousness, and populist uprisings.
Globalization, in other words, may facilitate a country's economic
development overall but, in countries with market-dominant
minorities, it may also aggravate ethnic concentrations of wealth,
stoking ethnic anger and resentment.

11. P. 108. There are other examples of African market-dominant minorities: the
Eritreans in Ethiopia, p. 111, the Ewe in Togo, p. 111, the Susu in Guinea, p. 111, the
Baganda in Uganda, p. 112, and the Chagga in Tanzania, p. 112. All of these groups have
been subjected to widespread resentment.
12. P. 113. Although there are examples of predatory practices by some of the Indians in
Kenya, they do not explain Indian economic dominance. Most of the Kenyan Indians
descend from coolie laborers brought by the British in the late 1800s to build the Uganda
Kenya railway. These Indians rose from poverty despite facing both discrimination from
colonial whites and animosity from native Africans. P. 114.
13. Pp. 116-17. The Lebanese arrived in Sierra Leone in the late 1800s, quickly became
skillful traders, buying produce from African farmers, waiting until prices rose, and then
selling them to European firms. P. 115. The Lebanese are known to work from dawn to dusk
and operate their businesses on very little overhead. Based on their reputation for
"industriousness and commercial acumen," p. 116, European firms readily granted them
long-term credit, which allowed them to consolidate their economic dominance.
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Under those conditions, Chua states there will predictably be
backlashes against markets - ethnically targeted nationalizations and
confiscations driven by ethnocentric· nationalism. Examples include
present-day Zimbabwe (p. 129), post-Sukarno Indonesia (pp. 132,
138), Sri Lanka (pp. 132-33), post-independence Burma (p. 133),
Bhutto's Pakistan (p. 133), Bolivia, Mexico, Peru (p. 134), and post
Soviet Russia (p. 139). Other possible backlashes include (1) a return
to authoritarianism in order to suppress ethnic hatred; and (2)
expulsions and genocide of the market-dominant minorities. Given the
alternatives, Chua concludes that among the range of available
remedies, ethnically conscious "affirmative action" for the ethnic
majorities is preferable. Chua advocates the institution of policies that
constrain the market activities of the market-dominant ethnic minority
to "alter the composition of the entrepreneurial class.''14
Chua's recommendation is based on two premises: first, a link
between violence against an ethnic minority and its market
dominance, and second, a link between non-violence and the degree
to which the state has blunted the minority's market dominance. A
number of scholars have questioned this link,15 but this Review's
critique of her recommendation assumes the establishment of the first
linkage. Even assuming such a link, however, corrective remedies, if
necessary, should not proceed along ethnically charged lines.
14. Kevin Davis et al., Ethnically Homogeneous Commercial Elites in Developing
Countries, 32 LA w & POL'Y I NT'L Bus. 331, 335 (2001). For a critical review of the
transformation of the term "affirmative action" from its original use - resolute
("affirmative") action to banish the scourge of racial discrimination in our public institutions
and private enterprises - into a shifted, dubious usage condoning and encouraging racial
discrimination in both, see William W. Van Alstyne, Affirmative Actions, 46 WAYNE L. REV.
1517 (2000).
15. See, e.g. , Davis et al., supra note 14, at 355-56. The authors point out that:
[T]here are examples of economically dominant minorities, such as the Lebanese in the
Caribbean, which have not been the targets of significant levels of violence. Second, in some
of the cases where dominant entrepreneurial minorities have been the targets of violence,
the minority's economic status appears to have been of secondary importance.
Id. at 355-56 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of scholars who believe that economic
disparities, particularly disparities in entrepreneurship, have a limited effect on ethnic
conflicts, see id. at 356-58. These scholars claim that ethnic conflicts are founded on
"primordial affiliations" and "ancient hatreds." Id. at 357. Perhaps most significantly, the
preeminent ethnic scholar, Donald Horowitz, believes that "while there is some evidence
that business rivals tend to be hostile toward elite minority groups, there is little evidence
that hostility on the part of either customers or workers has played a significant role in
ethnic conflict involving entrepreneurial minorities." Id. at 357 (citing DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 1 13-31 (1985)). Such conflicts, according to
Horowitz, are a manifestation of various group efforts to achieve status and legitimacy, and
the implication may be that groups that do not achieve status through economic dominance
or entrepreneurship would not necessarily turn to violence if there were viable outlets for
status achievement, for example, through politics and public administration. As some have
already noted, Chua herself has disclaimed that economic determinism is causally related to
ethnic conflicts, which makes one wonder why Chua favors the implementation of ethnically
conscious market interventions. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 355 n. 92.
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Evaluation of Ethnically Conscious Market Interventions

Chua puts forth a number of proposals to correct ethnic wealth
imbalances. Although many are in fact quite reasonable, sound, and
pragmatic, Chua dismisses them as unrealistic (p. 265). She admits that
" [e]ducational reform and equalization of opportunities for . . . poor
indigenous-blooded majorities" (p. 264) are necessary for market
benefits to reach those not already economically dominant. Where
political cronyism is a factor in the market dominance of certain ethnic
minorities, Chua states that eliminating such cronyism is necessary. It
is insufficient, however, because "such favoritism tends to be more the
consequence than the cause of market dominance" (p. 265), and most
market-dominant minorities are economically dominant at every level
of society, including those sectors where political connections play
little to no role in success. After considering redistributive measures
such as tax-and-transfer programs and social safety nets, Chua settles
on adopting aggressive affirmative-action programs to benefit
disadvantaged majorities (p. 269). This last measure would mean
"government interventions into the market, consciously designed to
'correct' ethnic wealth imbalances" (p. 269).
Take Malaysia. There, affirmative-action interventions include the
adoption of "sweeping ethnic quotas on corporate equity ownership,
university admissions, government licensing, and commercial
employment" (p. 270). The Malay Constitution allows government
control of university admission to benefit Malays,16 resulting in a
"brain drain" of Chinese students who enroll in universities abroad.17
Employment preferences, once confined to the public sector, have
been extended to the private sector as the government has established
quotas for Malay employment in commercial and industrial firms,18
including foreign firms whose investment in Malaysia is conditioned
on maintaining quotas for Malays.19
To increase Malay equity ownership, Chinese-owned Malaysian
companies must set aside 30% of their equity for Malays, "on financial
terms very generous to the new shareholders" and often with no
choice about the identity of the Malay set-aside recipients.20 Similarly,

16. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 660 (2d ed. 2000).
17. Id. at 661; THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN lNrERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 50 (1990).
18. Sumit Ganguly, Ethnic Policies and Political Quiescence in Malaysia and Singapore,
in GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 233, 260
(Michael E. Brown & Sumit Ganguly eds., 1997).
19. Id.
20. HOROWITZ, supra note 16, at 667, discussed in pp. 270-71; JAMES V. JESUDASON,
ETHNICITY AND THE ECONOMY: THE STATE, CHINESE BUSINESS, AND MULTINATIONALS
IN MALAYSIA 137, 141 (1989).
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any company seeking permission to expand or applying for import or
export licenses must sell 30% of its existing shares to native Malay or
Bumiputra-controlled entities or, alternatively, issue new shares to
ensure a 30% Bumiputra equity ownership.21 This 30% requirement
also applies to companies seeking a listing on the local stock
exchange.22
These measures are both invidious and superficial. They are
invidious as they are state-mandated discriminatory measures directed
against a politically vulnerable ethnic minority, resulting in
government exacerbation of ethnic division and consciousness. They
are superficial because they do not address one of the primary
underlying causes of Chinese market dominance - the ability of the
Chinese (and other middleman minorities) to create social capital
compared to the ethnic majority's. The majority's "low endowments of
social capital continue to limit that group's rate of entrepreneurship,"23
as in the case of the Malays. Purely redistributive measures in favor of
an ethnic group (such as nationalization or reserving a portion of
shares in a company for Malays) do not necessarily "have any impact
upon its level of direct investment in business enterprises. These
policies may turn them into investors but not entrepreneurs."24
Additionally, the Chinese in Malaysia have found ways to adjust to
such ethnically targeted corporate restructuring. First, to bypass
government-mandated Malay preferences, "Ali Baba" schemes
involving Malay front men are used in license applications, land
conveyances, share issuances, and contract bids; the front man's role is
limited to collecting a fee for the use of his name.25 Second, where
shares are transferred to Malays, the new shareholders tend to be
politically influential, allowing the firms to benefit from their political
connections. Participating in j oint ventures with the Urban
Development Authority (created to grant Malays a share in
development in cities) or with Pernas (the National Corporation
created to buy assets to be held in trust to distribute to Malays) has

21. Donald L. Horowitz, Causes and Consequences in Public Policy Theory: Ethnic
Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia, 22 POL'Y SCI. 249, 266-68 (1989). Bumiputra
refers to "native" or "indigenous" Malays and is sometimes used to highlight the claim that
Malaysians of Indian or Chinese descent are foreign.
22. CHRISTOPHER ADAM ET AL., ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUDIES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 228 (1992); Steve Glain, Ma/aysian's Grand Social Experiment
May Be Next Casualty ofAsian Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at A15.
23. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 353.
24. Id. at 353 n.89.
25. HOROWITZ, supra note 16, at 666; THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A
WORLD VIEW 52 (1994) (hereinafter SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE] .
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helped Chinese firms obtain project approvals they would have had
difficulty receiving otherwise.26
Although Chua acknowledges that her proposal is among the
"more controversial strateg[ies] for addressing the problem of market
dominant minorities" (p. 269), she makes no attempt to identify the
causes underlying a minority group's market dominance. Indeed, she
disclaims any such effort, stating that " [e]xplaining the market
dominance of various ethnic groups is not the focus of this book" (p.
42). This reluctance may be due to her apparently conflicted sense
about the extent to which corrupt alliances are a major factor in the
economic dominance of market-dominant minorities. Certainly the
book is replete with examples of corrupt alliances between market
dominant minorities and ruling elites.27 But it is unclear whether she
attributes minority wealth and dominance to corrupt alliances and
cronyism28 or to something else - entrepreneurialism, ingenuity, or
access to capital, for example.29 The distinction is important as the case
against wealth corruptly amassed is normatively strong and remedies
to rectify such corruption are relatively uncontroversial.30 By contrast,
the case against wealth derived from superiority in skill, hard work,
and entrepreneurialism is more complicated and remedies to reduce
26. HOROWITZ, supra note 16, at 667-68; K.S. Jomo, A Specific Idiom of Chinese
Capitalism in Southeast Asia, in ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS 250 (Daniel Chirot & Anthony Reid
eds., 1997).
27. See, e.g. , pp. 28, 30 (discussing the wealth of the Sino-Burmese and the handsome
payoffs made to Burma's ruling political elite); pp. 43-44, 151-52 (discussing Chinese
alliances with the Suharto regime in Indonesia); pp. 153-57 (discussing Chinese alliances with
the Marcos regime in the Philippines); pp. 148-51 (discussing Lebanese alliances with the
government officials of Sierra Leone); pp. 1 13-15, 157-58 (discussing Asian Indians' alliances
with the Moi regime in Kenya).
28. In fact, in several instances, she notes that cronyism is not the primary factor for
certain ethnic-minority dominance. See p. 113 ("[T)he suggestion that political cronyism is
the sole or even principal explanation of Indian economic dominance in Kenya overstates
the case."). She later writes:
Likewise, while political favoritism is a frequent, exacerbating problem in societies with a
market-dominant minority, such favoritism tends to be more the consequence than the cause
of market dominance. Most market-dominant minorities, whether the Bamileke in
Cameroon or Indians in Fiji, are disproportionately economically successful at every level of
society, including small traders, retailers, and shopkeepers with no political connections
whatsoever.
P. 265.
29. In her description of the European elites in Bolivia, Chua noted that most were
descendants of "enterprising waves of immigrants" from Europe. P. 55. For a list of African
market-dominant minorities, see supra note 1 1 .
30. Corrupt practices such a s bribery should b e dealt with through the institution of the
equivalent of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA"), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91
Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For literature outlining
the damage done by corruption, see, for example, M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption:
An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 441,
448-52 (1989), and Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599,
611-15 (1993).
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minority wealth in this case are more difficult to justify. In Part II
below, I examine why certain groups tend to be market dominant
despite external hostility and put forth two ethnically neutral
proposals, one directed inwardly toward group culture change and the
other directed outwardly toward the eradication of anticompetitive
market concentrations.
II.

ADDRESSING MARKETS AND MARKET-DOMINANT MINORITIES
IN E THNICALLY NEUTRAL WAYS

Although Chua gives multiple accounts of ethnic-minority market
dominance, she does not address how certain minority ethnic groups
manage to achieve economic dominance. Chua makes generalized
references to cronyism and corruption without necessarily attributing
them as the cause - or even a cause - of minority economic
success.31 But there are also references to hard work, social cohesion,
and "entrepreneurial energies" (p. 35) of the minorities such as the
Chinese. Indeed, while political favoritism and cronyism are a
problem, "such favoritism tends to be more the consequence than the
cause of market dominance" (p. 265). In those cases, the economic
dominance of the minority, particularly a middleman minority, is the
result of the group's levels of entrepreneurship.32 Affirmative action
for certain ethnic groups designated as deserving of preferences by the
government is particularly problematic in such a situation, where the
ethnic minority succeeds despite hostility only to be subject to
additional government-sanctioned discrimination in the name of
affirmative action.
Take, as an example, Chua's discussion of ethnic Chinese
dominance in Burma. Globalization in Burma has disproportionately
benefited the Burmese Chinese. Yet it is unclear from her discussion
whether Chinese dominance is due to Chinese wrongdoing or to
Chinese economic competitiveness and superior networks. Chua
noted that large infrastructure projects are in the hands of the Chinese
(pp. 25-26), but acknowledged these contracts were won " [a]gainst
international competition."33 And when the Burmese government
privatized the gem industry, "private mining concessions . . . sold on

31. Members of a minority ethnic group could by skill and hard work become wealthy
and then, to cope with majority resentment and hatred, turn to corrupt alliances with
government officials for political cover.
32. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 335.
33. Pp. 25-26 (quoting Myanmar and China: But Will the Flag Follow Trade?,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1994, at 35).
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the basis of competitive bidding" resulted in most of the
concessionaires going to Sino-Burmese businessmen.34
One example Chua discussed in detail is itself telling for the
contradictions inherent in her treatment of Chinese market
dominance. She examined the bean-curd industry in Java and the
chicken-feed industry in Bangkok. The first, founded by a local
Javanese woman in 1920, remains essentially unchanged after more
than eighty years and has floundered due to globalization and market
competition. The second, founded by two Chinese brothers who left
China "virtually penniless" (p. 40), settled in Thailand, and for years
lived "on next to nothing" (p. 40), is now a $9 billion global
conglomerate. Chua pointed out that what distinguishes the Javanese
tofu business from the Chinese-Thai chicken-feed business is
"breathtaking dynamism" combined with Chinese "frugality, hard
work, willingness to delay gratification, and intense desire to
accumulate wealth almost as an end in itself" (p. 42). Yet her solution
would punish the Chinese for their hard work and dynamism by
institutionalizing constraints to impede their progress. It is all the
more problematic given the fact that it is directed against politically
vulnerable minorities who have succeeded economically despite
external hostility. Additionally, it would harm the country
economically by depriving it of the full benefit of a group's
entrepreneurial spirit and capital.
Section II.A briefly explores the market dominance of certain
ethnic groups, focusing on the various mechanisms such groups use to
achieve economic success and argues that the market dominance of
certain ethnic groups can be ascribed to the groups' social-capital
reserves. In such cases, remedies should not be punitively aimed at
destroying the group's social-capital base. Indeed, for groups such as
the prototypical middleman minorities and others who become market
dominant despite external discrimination, corrective remedies to blunt
their economic achievement, by means of state-mandated
discrimination against them, in the name of affirmative action for the
majority are neither wise nor just. Rather than muffle a group's
competitive skills and its hard-to-acquire social-capital network, one
could instead examine whether certain social-capital attributes
associated with economic development could be similarly instilled in
the majority. This would involve a controversial strategy of causing a
group to tum inward and engage in culture change. Section II.B

34. P. 28. Chua also noted that Burma's gem industry is dominated by Burmese Chinese
at every level, from high-powered financiers to concession operators to jewelry shop owners,
and that Burmese government officials "are also handsomely paid off at every level." P. 28.
Again, it is unclear whether the Chinese achieved economic dominance only because of
corrupt payments to officials or whether corrupt payments to officials are simply expected as
a part of doing business in Burma.

Michigan Law Review

1056

[Vol. 102:1044

employs a more outward strategy, relying on the principles of
competition law to address the ethnic minority's dominance in certain
economic sectors.
A. Social Capital and Culture35
1.

Homogeneous Groups, Ethnic Economies, and the Ethnic
Boundary

There are many factors that underlie an ethnic minority's market
dominance. Some are descendants of colonizers, for example,
Europeans in South Africa. Some are classic middleman minorities
who were commercially astute and economically dominant even
before the colonial age.36 Others are immigrants who began from the
humblest ladder rung and have managed to achieve economic
dominance in their adopted country. The Indians, brought to Fiji and
East Africa as coolies or indentured servants, are examples of the last
scenario.37
Chua suggests, without stating it directly, that cultural factors may
explain the economic success of certain market-dominant minorities
- certainly those in the second and third categories mentioned above.
In comparing the Burmans with the Chinese, Chua expressed that
" [h]uman capital levels among indigenous Burmans are . . . abysmal"
(p. 29). There might be "cultural obstacles," such as "a native
prejudice against 'greedy' profit-seeking [which] make it extremely
35. The term "culture" is used in many different ways. Culture originally referred to the
cultivation of crops or animals. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 77 (1976). Cultural
anthropologists have long recognized the inherent difficulty of defining "culture." There are
more than one hundred definitions of culture, ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE
ANTHROPOLOGISTS' ACCOUNT 56 (1999), for example, "the total way of life of a people";
"the social legacy the individual acquires from his group"; "a storehouse of pooled learning";
"a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems"; "a mechanism for the normative
regulation of behavior." CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 4-5
(1973) (quoting CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, MIRROR FOR MAN (1965)) (quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at 89 (defining culture as a "historically transmitted pattern of meanings
embodied in symbols"). Geertz, it has been said, subscribes to a "thick description" of
culture, using it "to refer to the entire way of life of a society: its values, practices, symbols,
institutions, and human relationships." Samuel P. Huntington, Cultures Count, Foreword to
CULTURE MATTERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS, at xiii, xv (Lawrence E.
Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000) [hereinafter CULTURE MATTERS]. By
contrast, a "thin description" of culture would encompass only "subjective terms as the
values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people
in a society." Id.
German philosophers in the eighteenth century used the term "Kultur" to describe the
process of inculcating into or civilizing individuals; the term subsequently became
synonymous with the term "civilization." KUPER, supra, note 35 at 30-32.
36. See, e.g. , CLIFFORD GEERTZ, PEDDLERS AND PRINCES: SOCIAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN Two INDONESIAN TOWNS 25-26 (1963).
37. THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW 310, 314 (1996)
[hereinafter SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURE].
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difficult for Burmans to compete in a market economy" (p. 29). Some
have observed that certain ethnic groups do not favor engaging in
commercial activities, preferring instead employment in the public
sector38 or living a subsistence as opposed to an acquisitive or
competitive lifestyle.39 Others have noted the low level of social
capital reserves among certain groups such as the Malays and hence
the inability of group members to engage in intra-cooperative
economic activities.4° Cultural attributes may also explain why "many
market-dominant minorities have been successful notwithstanding
long histories of official discrimination against them. This is certainly
true of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Lebanese in West Africa, and
Jews almost everywhere" (p. 265).
Sociologists and even some legal scholars have long noted the
existence of market-dominant minorities and explored the reasons
behind their economic success. Such groups have invariably formed
their own ethnic economies41 - economies owned by ethnic members
and predominantly hiring other coethnics - or as W.E.B. Du Bois
called it, the "group economy: 'a cooperative arrangement of
industries and services within the Negro group such that the group
tends to be a closed economic circle largely independent of the
surrounding white world.' "42 Often, ethnic economies start out serving
the ethnic market and later break out to serve non-ethnic clientele.43
In addition, various groups "have become prominent or
predominant in particular occupations in countries all over the
planet,"44 creating economic niches - the clustering of ethnic
entrepreneurs in the same occupations and industries.45 In the United
States, Indians and Pakistanis own a large proportion of the budget
motels and gas stations in New York City.46 Koreans own green

38. Davis et al., supra note 14. at 340 (noting that even Malay-Muslim businessmen in
Malaysia regard public-sector employment as more prestigious than engaging in commerce).
39. Id. at 340 (discussing native Fijians).
40. Id. at 348.
41. IVAN LIGHT & STEVEN J. GOLD, ETHNIC ECONOMIES 4 (2000).
42. Roger Waldinger & Howard Aldrich, Trends in Ethnic Business in the United States,
in ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS: IMMIGRANT BUSINESS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 49, 59
(Roger Waldinger et al. eds., 1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting W.E.B. Du BOIS,
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG NEGRO AMERICANS 179 (1907)); see also W.E.B. DU
BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 43 (Bedford Books 1997) (1903).
43. Roger Waldinger et al., Opportunities, Group Characteristics, and Strategies, in
ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 42, at 13, 23-24; Waldinger & Aldrich, supra note
42, at 57.
44. SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE, supra note 25, at 2.
45. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 41, at 20.
46. Jonathan Foreman, Bombay on the Hudson, MANHATTAN INST. CITY J., Summer
1997, at 14, available at LEXIS, News Library, Cityjr File; Edwin McDowell, Hospitality Is
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groceries in New York City and wig stores nationwide.47 Arabs and
Lebanese Muslims own grocery stores in Chicago and Detroit,
respectively.48 Soviet Jews operate at least fifty-percent of taxis in Los
Angeles.49 Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and
other Southeast Asian countries dominate commerce and are known
as middleman minorities, due to their "go-between" positions between
producer and consumer, owner and renter, elite and masses, employer
and employee.50 Thus, " [c]apital and labor are often organized along
ethnic lines. Fukienese entrepreneurs in Hong Kong, Malayalee clerks
in Bombay, and Ibo plantation laborers in Equatorial Guinea were all
mobilized into their economic activity on the basis of ethnic affinity."51
The dominance of certain ethnic groups in certain economic
sectors might be due to factors found in the host country (which might
explain why a group is more successful outside its home country than
within) or it might "reflect[] their traditional positions in the
occupational hierarchies of their homeland prior to migration," which
may shed light on why " [m]igrants from 'commercial cultures' like the
Parsis, the Banyas, the money lending Bhatias, the Memons, the
Bohras, the Khojas - all Gujarati groups - long dominated trade
and commerce in West India and later in East Africa as well."52
Similar observations have been made about Chinese retailers, India's
Gujarati merchants, German farmers, Jewish middlemen, and
Lebanese traders in many countries.53
Their Business, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at Dl; Robert Reinhold, Flow of 3d World
Immigrants Alters Weave of U.S. Society, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1986, at Al.
47. IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS JN LOS
ANGELES, 1965-1982, at 37, 151 (1988); Richard Levine, Young Immigrant Wave Lifts New
York Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at Al; Reinhold, supra note 46.
48. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 47, at 439 n.4.
49. Id.
50. HOWARD PAUL BECKER, MAN IN RECIPROCITY 225-37 (1956).
51. HOROWITZ, supra note 16, at 8. An example is the dominance of Jews in New
York's garment industry. One might explain such dominance by noting the influx of Jewish
immigrants into the city, but an international perspective reveals that:
Jews have been prominent, if not predominant, in the apparel industry over a period longer
than the entire history of the United States, and in countries ranging from medieval Spain to
modern Australia, from the Ottoman Empire to the Russian Empire, as well as in
Argentina, Brazil, Germany, and Chile.
SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE, supra note 25, at 2.
52. Ivan Light et al., Migration Networks and Immigrant Entrepreneurship, in
IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 25, 40 (Ivan Light & Parminder Bhachu eds., 1993)
(citation omitted) (quoting Jagdish S. Gundara, British Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, Imperial
Enterprise and Indians in Nineteenth Century Zanzibar (1990) (paper presented at the
Indian Diaspora Conference at the University of Toronto)).
53. ROBIN COHEN, GLOBAL DIASPORAS: AN INTRODUCTION 170 (1997) [hereinafter
COHEN, GLOBAL DIASPORAS]; SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE, supra note 25, at 2, 11,
12, 47.
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In numerous and diverse countries, these minorities establish an
ethnic economy by relying on group cohesiveness and homogeneous
networks to benefit group members. Where certain ethnic economies
are formed by recent immigrants, there may also be benefits derived
from the diaspora's linkages to its homeland institutions.54 In the
United States, for example, Korean-owned firms tend to engage in a
form of vertical intra-group preferences: Korean importers rely on
Korean suppliers from Korea and distribute those Korean-made
products to coethnic wholesalers who in turn distribute them to
coethnic retailers for sale.55 In the retail wig business, ninety-five
percent of those surveyed stated they depended on Korean suppliers
for wigs made in South Korea.56 At the same time, Korean newcomers
who start business dealing with Korean-imported products "have easy
access to information and can very often purchase merchandise on a
credit basis. In operating such businesses, they receive preferential
treatments from Korean wholesalers in item selections, prices, speed
of delivery and credits."57
Sociologists have observed the tendency to identify members of
one's ethnic group as "hear or distant kinsmen whom one knows as
intimates and whom therefore one can trust. One intuitively expects
fellow ethnics to behave at least somewhat benevolently toward one
because of kin selection, reinforced by reciprocity. . . . Fellow ethnics
are, in the deepest sense, 'our people.' "58 In the establishment of
ethnic economies, the ethnic group generally exhibits certain recurring
characteristics, such as "clannishness,"59 adhering to group norms and
maintaining the ethnic boundary delineating insiders from outsiders.
This insular proclivity abounds among different ethnic groups in
different countries all over the world: the Hasidic Jews in New York
City's diamond industry, Lebanese traders in Sierra Leone, the
Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Indians in Uganda, the Koreans and

54. Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1012-14 (2001).
55. LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 41, at 121; Pyong Gap Min, Korean Immigrants in Los
Angeles, in IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 52, at 185, 196; Waldinger
& Aldrich, supra note 42, at 71; Linda J. Wong, The Role of Immigrant Entrepreneurs in
Urban Economic Development, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 79 (1996) (describing how
"immigrant consumers and entrepreneurs maintain cultural, social, and economic ties with
their homelands that dramatically increase export opportunities"). According to Korean
owners in Los Angeles, between sixty-six and one hundred percent of their suppliers were
Koreans and that many of them were part of "a vertical distribution network that might
originate in South Korea." LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 47, at 151.
56. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 47, at 151.
57. Waldinger & Aldrich, supra note 42, at 71 (quoting Pyong Gap Min, A Structural
Analysis of Korean Business in the United States, 6 ETHNIC GROUPS 1 (1984)).
58. PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON 25 (1981).
59. SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE, supra note 25, at 49.
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Indians in the United States,<'0 the Turks in the garment industry in
Paris and Berlin,61 the Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians in the
retail trade in France,62 and so forth.
Ethnic economies, in other words, like traditional capitalism, are
based on personal relationships and ethnic ties. According to Max
Weber, outcast groups such as the Jews are ethnically insular and
segregated from the mainstream by their observance of "taboos . . .
[and] hereditary religious obligations in the conduct of life. "63 Their
pariah status instilled in Jews a "dual ethic," with one set of ethics for
dealing with Jews and another set for dealing with non-Jews.64
Other scholars have expanded on Weber's theory with research on
middleman minorities and trade diasporas. The term "middleman
minority" originally referred to ethnic minorities who were market
traders in precapitalist societies. Middleman minorities are marginal
people who specialize in trading and are part of global diasporas, such
as the overseas Chinese, Jews, and Lebanese.65 As pariah minorities
themselves, these middlemen exhibit "caste-like attributes"66 and
shared loyalties.67 Their outsider status means diasporic traders often
60.

Id. at 50-52, 54-59.

61. Mirjana Morokvasic, Immigrants in Garment Production in Paris and in Berlin, in
IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 52, at 75, 76-82.
62. Gildas Simon, Immigrant Entrepreneurs in France, in IMMIGRATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 52, at 125, 132-34.
63. MAX WEBER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 109 (Ephraim Fischoff trans., Beacon
Press 1963) (1922). Weber also believed that Jews were not sufficiently free of communal
loyalties to engage in rational, bourgeois capitalism. For Weber, "Jewish capitalism was
speculative pariah-capitalism, while the Puritan was bourgeois organization of labour." MAX
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 271 n.58 (Talcott
Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1930) (1920) [hereinafter, WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC]. Karl Marx similarly explained that Jews were disliked because they were not
Christians and because their tendency toward "huckstering" gave them an economic
advantage which made them even more despised. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843),
in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 48 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1843).
64. MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 614 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Bedminster Press 1968) (1914). Jews are associated with the primitive, ethnic capitalism
practiced by pariah minorities. The same charges have been directed at the Chinese. Allen J.
Chun, Pariah Capitalism and the Overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia: Problems in the
Definition of the Problem, 12 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 233, 233-56 (1989); Gary Hamilton,
Pariah Capitalism: A Paradox ofPower and Dependence, 2 ETHNIC GROUPS 1, 1-15 (1978).

65. COHEN, GLOBAL DIASPORAS, supra note 53, at 101-04. Early works study the role
middleman minorities play in the economic structure of host countries and its impact on
ethnic relations. See, e.g., HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY
GROUP RELATIONS (1967); ABNER COHEN, CUSTOMS AND POLITICS IN URBAN AFRICA 1425 (1969) (hereinafter COHEN, CUSTOMS AND POLITICS]; R.A. SCHERMERHORN,
COMPARATIVE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THEORY AND RESEARCH
(1970).
66. COHEN, GLOBAL DIASPORAS, supra note 53, at 101.
67. For members of diasporas, "(t]he powerful pull of loyalty exerted by the imagined
nation demonstrates that, even in the age of science, a loyalty system based on romantic
myths of shared history and kinship has a capacity to endure that may be the envy of a state

May 2004)

Ethnic Question in Law & Development

1061

develop an "aptitude for economic specialization" because their
"psychological self-isolation would prove impossible if those who
practised it did not, at the same time, develop on the economic plane a
special efficiency in the exploitation of such economic opportunities as
had been left open to them. "68 Middleman minorities may be market
dominant yet politically vulnerable, uncomfortably "lodged
between . . . two ethnic groups that stand in a classlike relation of
superordination and subordination. The dominant elite of the
dominant group uses the middleman minority to foster economic
development, but turns it into a scapegoat when things go wrong. "69
Many factors shed light on the widespread existence of ethnic
economies, but external factors - outsider status, vulnerability, and
disadvantage - are crucially relevant. In other words, the boundaries
established by the ethnic group, or imposed upon it by a hostile
society, engender cooperation and solidarity among members within
the group. Max Weber acknowledged that Catholic discrimination
against Protestants, including the exclusion of Protestants from the
civil service and the armed forces - not just the Protestant ethic contributed significantly to the high incidence of Protestant
entrepreneurship.70 Werner Sombart attributed Jewish dominance in
commerce to exclusion of Jews from medieval trade guilds.71 Scholars
have subsequently advanced disadvantage as a major reason for the
high rates of entrepreneurship72 among ethnic minorities denied

with the most liberal civil society and patriotic citizenry." Thomas M. Franck, Clan and
Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 374
(1996).
68. COHEN, GLOBAL DIASPORAS, supra note 53, at 103.
69. Id.
70. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 63, at 5-7.
71. WERNER SOMBART, THE JEWS AND MODERN CAPITALISM 300-01 (1913).
72. See, e.g., IVAN LIGHT & CAROLYN ROSENSTEIN, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN URBAN AMERICA 161 (1995) (discussing how labor market
impediments caused middleman minorities to turn to "defensive self-employment); Howard
Aldrich et al., From Periphery to Peripheral: The South Asian Petit Bourgeoisie in England,
in 2 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK: PERIPHERAL WORKERS 1, 8 (Ida Harper
Simpson & Richard L. Simpson eds., 1983) (stating that "because of natives whites'
prejudice and hostility," Asians in England must "seek employment below their skill level or
else create their own employment opportunity by forming a small business"); Annie
Phizacklea, Entrepreneurship, Ethnicity, and Gender, in ENTERPRISING WOMEN:
ETHNICITY, ECONOMY, AND GENDER RELATIONS 20, 21 (Sallie Westwood & Parminder
Bhachu eds., 1988) (describing entrepreneurship as an escape route for minority men stuck
in dead-end jobs because of racism); Chua Lee Hoong, The Business of Race in the Race for
Business, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 29, 1996, at 34, available at 1996 WL 1 4659458
(describing how Chinese ethnic networks were a reaction against discrimination when banks
refused to lend to "Chinamen"); cf Davis et al., supra note 14, at 344 (describing how
Indians were brought to Fiji and East Africa as indentured laborers and faced invidious
hostility).
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"access to maj ority-controlled paths of economic advancement."73
" [C]ompensatory entrepreneurship" is thus a response to hostility.74
Scholars have also attributed the minority creation of ethnic
economies to internal factors, for example, group characteristics
consisting of ethnic resources and ethnic social capital. External
hostility, especially toward groups deemed "unassimilable," creates
solidarity within the group and contributes to the group's reliance on
ethnic resources to create social capital.75 Groups with a social-capital
base of "networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination
and cooperation for mutual benefit"76 are particularly poised to
produce economic capital. Absent trust, "elaborate and expensive
bonding and insurance devices would be necessary - or else the
transactions could not take place."77 This particular form of trust founded on common external and internal factors, such as societal
hostility and shared cultural values - is "not easily duplicated in any
artificial community, and indeed, (is] rarely found in communities
united
by
geographic proximity or
other
demographic
characteristics."78 Groups with a thick social-capital base "convert
social characteristics of their group into economic resources, thus
creating employment and income independent of class resources."79
Interconnectedness allows the group to use its social capital to
improve its economic capital80 in three crucial areas: obligations and
expectations, access to information, and norms enforced by effective
sanctions.81 Unlike human capital, which consists of knowledge and
skills acquired through individual education and training, social capital
grows out of group relations, consists of group-based factors that
encourage cooperation among group members, and is transmitted

73. Patricia G. Greene, A Resource-Based Approach to Ethnic Business Sponsorship: A
Consideration of /smaili-Pakistani Immigrants, 35 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 58, 59 (1997).
74. LIGHT & ROSENSTEIN, supra note 72, at 160.
75. Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economics: Beyond the Pale?, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1521, 1594-95 (2003) [hereinafter Cao, The Diaspora].
76. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995). For a discussion of the various uses of the term "social capital"
in scholarship, see Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35,
at 98, 100.
77. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc.
S95, S99 (Supp. 1988).
78. Greene, supra note 73, at 67.
79. LIGHT & ROSENSTEIN, supra note 72, at 24.
80. SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE, supra note 25, at 49-55.
81. JAMES s. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990); Coleman,
supra note 77, at S97-S101.
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through cultural mechanisms such as religion, tradition, and historical
habits.B2
This explains the prevalence and strength of ethnically
homogeneous middleman trading groups, for example, the East
Indians in East Africa, the Jews in Europe, and the pockets of ethnic
economies in the United States and other countries.B3 One
characteristic of such groups is "the idea that a trader will discriminate
among potential partners in order to economize on the cost of
enforcing contracts. "84 Members of groups that share easily observable
traits, such as language, race, or ethnicity, rely on such common
characteristics as cost-effective proxies for inferring other potentially
relevant information, thereby allowing the group to lower transaction
costs and solve market imperfections.B5 These transactions are
embedded in ethnic relationships and involve, by implication, certain
preferences for members of the same ethnic group and exclusion of
non-members.86
A word of caution is appropriate. At some point, kinship ties could
dampen individual incentives to accumulate wealth87 and facilitate

82. FRANCIS FuKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 26-27 (1995).
83. Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of
Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 15, 15 (1984); Davis et al., supra
note 14, at 344-45.
84.

Cooter & Landa, supra note 83, at 15.

85. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economies of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1021 (1995); see also
Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 853 (1999)
[hereinafter Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets] (discussing how communal
cohesiveness allows a homogenous ethnic group to bypass barriers in the mainstream market
and lower transaction costs through intra-group exchanges).
86. Cao, The Diaspora, supra note 75, at 1598-99; Davis et al., supra note 14, at 347.
87. Max Weber, of course, argued that the spread of Calvinism, which emphasized
"individualistic motives of rational legal acquisition by virtue of one's own ability and
initiative," WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 63, at 179, quoted in ALAN
MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY, PROPERTY AND
SOCIAL TRANSITION 47 (1978), "had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of
goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics." Id. at 47. By elevating rational thought
over superstition and magic and the pursuit of individual over communal interests,
Protestantism helped to "shatter the fetters of the kinship group." Id. at 50, quoted in
MACFARLANE, supra. Subsequent scholars have echoed Weber's warnings of the fetters of
kinship. See, e.g. , PETER T. BAUER & BASIL S. YAMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDER
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 64 (1957) ("[T]he extended family . . . is an example of an
institution which has many advantages in one stage of economic achievement, but which may
later become a drag on economic development."); W. ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH 114 (1955) ("The extended family system has tremendous advantages
in societies living at a subsistence level, but it seems not to be appropriate to societies where
economic growth is occurring. In such societies it is almost certainly a drag on effort.").
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corruption,88 so that a collectivist norm that once facilitated economic
development could end up impeding it.89 Intra-group trust and
reciprocity could remain frozen and inward-directed, so that the once
beneficial norm of collectivism could cause stagnation because no
collective action is possible outside the group.90 Group preferences for
group members may prevail even after the group has become
dominant, leading to excessive clannishness and systematic exclusion
of other ethnic groups.91 In this latter case, the state may apply its
antidiscrimination laws, striking down commercial arrangements
where one person was favored over another because of ethnicity.92 It
could also, as I examine in Section II.B, respond with antitrust law to

88. LEWIS, supra note 87, at 114 (noting that strong group ties may facilitate
bureaucratic corruption and nepotism because bureaucrats may be bound first by obligations
to traditional networks rather than to outsiders with superior credentials).
89. The same observation might be made about certain cultural attributes, for example,
Japanese frugality, which may be developmentally helpful at one stage (post-World War 11)
but not another (the current prolonged recession), Fukuyama, supra note 76, at 100, or the
East Asian tendency to rely on personal ties in economic transactions, which "served
economic development well for nearly half a century . . . [but) are not likely to serve the
region as well in the future," Dwight H. Perkins, Law, Family Ties, and the East Asian Way
of Business, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35, at 232, 243.
90. See, e.g. , EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY 85
(1958) (stating that the norms of amoral familism (essentially loyalty only to family)
impeded the development of norms that would further non-familial, collective cooperation;
in this sense, amoral familism might be viewed as a limited collectivism among immediate
family members, but with respect to those outside the family sphere, amoral familism is an
intensely individualistic norm); FUKUYAMA, supra note 82, at 57 (stating that although trust
and small-group cohesiveness are crucial to the creation of prosperity, the ability of
"business organizations to move beyond the family rather rapidly and to create a variety of
new, voluntary social groups that were not based on kinship" is also necessary for the
development of "large, modern, rationally organized, professionally managed corporations"
such as those of Japan and Germany); Partha Dasgupta, Economic Progress and the Idea of
Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 325, 388-90 (Partha
Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 2000) (arguing that "past accumulation of certain kinds
of social capital can act as a drag on economic development, by preventing more efficient
institutions from spreading"); Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining
System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830 (1996) (arguing that trade sustained by personal
relationships of trust and reciprocity can impede the development of a functioning market
economy because if most people engage only in reciprocal exchanges, the number of
potential partners will be limited and the search costs to find a partner will be high; dense
personal networks could impede the development of impersonal markets).
91. Cf. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 348 (finding that despite the fact that ethnic
networks do discriminate against outsiders in certain decisions, such as credit extension or
business transfers or the choice of partners in joint ventures, there is no discrimination in
typical retail transactions, which supports the hypothesis that these networks exist primarily
to "help their members minimize the risk of opportunistic behaviour").
92. See generally Cao, The Diaspora, supra note 75, at 1600-07. This may be especially
needed in hiring decisions to ensure that members of other ethnic groups have access to
employment within an ethnic economy, especially if that ethnic economy is dominant. This
would accord with the recommendation by some scholars that rather than focus on programs
to " redistribute entrepreneurial opportunities," Davis et al., supra note 14, at 354, "devel
oping states should focus on opportunities to engage in fulfilling employment," id. at 355.
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eliminate anticompetitive practices that perpetuate group preferences
and dominance.
In addition to outward-directed measures that aim to change
commercial practices, inward-directed measures may also be useful.
To the extent that certain cultural attributes advance or impede
economic development, one must inquire further whether culture
change is possible or desirable.
2.

Culture Developmentalism and Culture Change

It is an overstatement to assert that culture provides the sole or
perhaps even primary explanation for an ethnic group's market
dominance. But even eschewing monocausal explanations to take into
account "intervening variables and . . . situational context,"93 one
could assert that culture plays some role or even, as some have put it,
"culture makes almost all the difference. Witness the enterprise of
expatriate minorities - the Chinese in East and Southeast Asia,
Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, Jews and Calvinists
throughout much of Europe, and on and on."94 A recent study tested
the culture/economics linkage using cross-country data, focusing on a
country's social capital and its relationship to growth (in per capita
income), and found a correlation between the level of trust and
economic growth.95 Scholars have long identified certain traits that
93. Lucian W. Pye, "Asian Values": From Dynamos to Dominoes?, in CULTURE
MAITERS, supra note 35, at 244, 254. At the level of intuition alone, one would not claim
that culture explains everything. "Economists are not alone in asking why some people the Chinese, say - have long been so unproductive at home yet so enterprising away. If
culture matters, why didn't it change China?" David Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the
Difference, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35, at 2, 2. Similarly, as others have observed,
"the same values, operating . . . in quite different circumstances, can and usually will produce
different effects." Pye, supra, at 245. This may explain why Asian values, touted as crucial to
the Asian economic "miracle," became a negative factor in the late 1990s:
The combination of a drive for greater market share above all else, a fixation on only the
long run, and the notion that it is heroic to suffer the pains of delayed gratification - all
essential Asian values - inspired economically useful behavior during the initial stages of
economic development, but the combination led in time to serious problems of overcapacity
and numerous bubble economies.
Id. at 253.
Hence a word of caution is needed in any attempt to explore the relationship between
culture and economic development. "We need to be somewhat humble in ascribing precise
weights to cultural variables. We know that they are important, but exactly how important at
any particular time is hard to judge. We are dealing with clouds, not clocks, with general
approximations, not precise cause-and-effect relationships." Id. at 255.
94. Landes, supra note 93, at 2. See generally DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND
POVERTY OF NATIONS (1998).
95. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A
Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997). The authors used data gathered
from thousands of interviews in industrialized and developing countries, in which the
respondents were asked their attitudes about family life, work, religion, and other values. In
measuring a country's social capital, the authors asked, "Generally speaking, would you say
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appear to correlate with positive economic performance.96 To
whatever degree, culture (and the bundle of norms and behaviors that
flow from it, such as group cooperation and social capital) does
matter. As Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan
discovered and conceded in pondering the post-Soviet experience of
Russia, economic transformation did not "automatically establish a
free-market entrepreneurial system"97 merely because capitalism was
"human nature."98 Instead, Greenspan acknowledged that it was "not
nature at all, but culture."99
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan aptly observed: "The central
conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the
success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change
a culture and save it from itself."100 If cultural factors are relevant and
culture does in fact shape economic development, can culture be
changed (through politics and other avenues) and cultural obstacles
removed?101

that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Id.
at 1256. For the twenty-nine market economies included in the study, they found that,
controlling for income, education, and private investment, trust is positively correlated with
growth in per capita income. Indeed:
[A] ten-percentage point rise in [trust] is associated with an increase in growth of four-fifths
of a percentage point. A one-standard-deviation change in trust (fourteen percentage points)
is associated with a change in growth of more than one-half (.56) of a standard deviation,
nearly as large as the standardized coefficient for primary education (.64).
Id. at 1260.
96. Max Weber identified certain attributes associated with the "Protestant ethic:"
individualism, a desire to compete, overcome nature, and achieve chosen goals. WEBER,
THE PROTESTANT ETHIC, supra note 63. Others have focused on group cooperation and
trust, FUKUYAMA, supra note 82, and preference for investment in education and work over
consumption and leisure. LAWRENCE E. HARRISON, WHO PROSPERS?: HOW CULTURAL
VALUES SHAPE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUCCESS 16-23 (1992); SOWELL, MIGRATIONS
AND CULTURE, supra note 37, at 17; Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middlemen Minorities, 38
AM. Soc. REV. 583, 585 (1973).
97. William Pfaff, Western Economic Theories Have Left Soviet Bloc Economies in
Shambles, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1999, at 15.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Huntington, supra note 35, at xiv.
101. Chua is uncomfortable with this inquiry and with the very notion of culture change
- first, whether it is possible and second, whether it is normatively desirable. On the first
question, "[a]ttempts to inculcate a 'work ethic' . . . have not proved . . . effective. Indigenous
elites in developing countries have frequently encouraged their fellow citizens to emulate
market-dominant minorities and to become more 'diligent' and 'motivated.' " P. 266. She
notes that exhortations by Malaysia's prime minister for the ethnic Malays to model
themselves after the Chinese have not been successful. "Not surprisingly, such governmental
'cultural revolutions' - attempting to change culture from the top down - have been
notoriously unsuccessful." P. 266. On the second question, she observes: "Apart from the
issue of feasibility, there is also a moral question. 'Culture' cannot simply be treated as an
inconvenient impediment to free markets." P. 266.
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There are, however, scholars from certain disciplines, such as
economics and anthropology, who shy away from even exploring or
asserting a linkage between culture and economic development.
Economists generally view the adoption of the right economic policy
as producing the desired economic result without regard to culture.
Culture, for economists, is an uncomfortable realm, perhaps because
"it presents definitional problems, is difficult to quantify, and operates
in a highly complex context with psychological, institutional, political,
geographic, and other factors."102 Anthropologists, influenced by the
tradition of cultural relativism, may be reluctant to evaluate the
cultural norms and practices of another society.103 As a noted
sociologist observed,
In the humanities and liberal circles generally, a rigid orthodoxy now

prevails that can be summarized as follows: Culture is a symbolic system
to be interpreted, understood, discussed, delineated, respected, and

celebrated as the distinctive product of a particular group of people, of
equal worth with all other such products. But it should never be used to
explain anything about the people who produced it.104

Other reasons why cultural explanations may be disfavored in
intellectual circles include concerns over the concept of culture as
"over-determining,"105 the possible use of culture "by reactionary
analysts and public figures" as a way to "blam[e] the victim"106 or

102. Lawrence E. Harrison, Why Culture Matters, Introduction to CULTURE MATTERS,
supra note 35, at xvii, xxv (hereinafter Harrison, Why Culture Matters).
103. For example, Richard Shweder writes:
[T)he assertion that "culture matters" is a way of saying that some cultures are impoverished
or backward, whereas others are enriched or advanced. It means there are good things in life
(e.g., health, domestic tranquility, justice, material prosperity, hedonic self-stimulation, and
small families) that all human beings ought to want and have but that their culture keeps
them from wanting and/or having.
Richard A. Shweder, Moral Maps, "First World" Conceits, and the New Evangelists, in
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35, at 158, 160; see also id. at 161 ("I have never put much
stock in the view that holds that a good reason for becoming interested in other cultures is
that they are impediments to the realization of some imagined universal aspiration of all
people to be more like northern Europeans.").
In a similar vein, in 1947, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological
Association declined to endorse the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
because it viewed the Declaration as ethnocentric. Harrison, Why Culture Matters, supra
note 102, at xxvi.

104. Orlando Patterson, Taking Culture Seriously: A Framework and an Afro-American
Illustration, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35, at 202, 202. This position is a reversal of
the position that prevailed earlier, "when the Parsonian theory of values as ends and
normative regulators of action was predominant." Id. at 203.
105. Id. at 203. This means relying on a "simplistic or untenable conception of culture"
and using it "in a crudely deterministic way" to explain certain group's problems, so that
culture is viewed as "a fixed, explanatory black box invoked to explain anything and
everything about the group." Id.
106. Id. at 204. Professor Patterson rejects the argument that cultural explanations
amount to blaming the victim. If a person who has low self-esteem and behaves in self-

1068

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:1044

avoid questions about the impact laws and policies may have on
poverty,107 and the desire to celebrate cultural diversity and ethnic
pride.108 Additionally, evaluating culture makes many well-meaning
people uncomfortable because "criticisms of culture cut close to the
ego and injure identity and self-esteem. Coming from outsiders, such
animadversions . . . stink of condescension. "109 Thus the following
statement is an accurate description of the ambiguous role ascribed to
culture: "We all realize that before we resort to culture today to
explain the differences in economic progress or political attitudes
among nations and ethnic groups, we prefer to find other
explanations."110 Assuming that most people in most countries desire
economic development, and assuming that culture is one crucial factor
in achieving that objective, the question of culture change becomes an
important one. Is it possible and is it desirable?
Culture is not confined to and bounded by national demarcations,
as it is continuously influenced by subnational and transnational
elements.111 Thus, culture is not static, and what might be presented as
an inextricable part of a national culture might in fact be a recent
development prompted by economic circumstances. The Japanese, for
example, insist that eating whale meat has cultural significance and
therefore are unwilling to be bound by the international ban on
whaling, despite considerable international pressure.112 Yet, until
World War II, whale meat was not an important food source in Japan.
It was only during the postwar period, when non-whale protein
sources were scarce, that the Japanese relied on whale meat for school
lunches.113 Similarly, Japan's lifetime employment system and its high
savings rate, generally deemed to be an essential component of the

defeating ways as a result of having been abused is told by someone to go to a psychologist
to seek therapy, "[i]t would be absurd to accuse that person of blaming the victim. Yet this is
exactly what happens when a sympathetic analyst is condemned for even hinting that some
Afro-American problems may be the tragic consequences of their cultural adaptation to an
abusive past." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Landes, supra note 93, at 2.
110. Nathan Glazer, Disaggregating Culture, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35, at
219, 220.
111. See, e.g. , Mario Vargas Llosa, The Culture of Liberty, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan./Feb.
2001, at 66, 68 (denouncing the "static conception of culture that has no historical basis"); id.
at 70 ("Cultures must live freely, constantly jousting with different cultures. This renovates
and renews them, allowing them to evolve and adapt to the continuous flow of life.").
112. In 1982, the International Whaling Commission adopted a moratorium on whaling.
Japan was one of the few countries that opposed the ban. See Chairman's Report of the
Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting, 34 REP. INT'L WHALING COMMISSION 13 (1984).
1 13. Suvendrini Kakuchi, Tokyo Persists with Bid to Lift Whaling Ban, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Nov. 13, 1997, at http://members.aol.com/cmwwrc/marmamnews/97111301.html.
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country's cultural characteristics, came out of the post-World War II
experience; lifetime employment was instituted to control labor strife
and high savings was adopted by those with direct wartime experience
of deprivation and shortages.114 "Thus it is difficult to disentangle
culturally derived behaviors from behaviors that have been enhanced
or encouraged by the economic system."115 According to the noted
Jamaican-born sociologist, Professor Orlando Patterson, Afro
American cultural models of "compensatory sexuality" and
"unsecured paternity"116 celebrating early marriage and high fertility
have roots in the economic institutions of slavery and sharecropping.
This cultural model, however, is not static because "although cultural
continuities certainly exist, people are not slaves to them. They use
them and they can change them if they really want to."117 Culture is
pliable and changing rather than static or deterministic. "Biology helps
explain human behavior but does not determine it. Similarly, culture
helps explain behavior but does not determine it, either."118 Hence,
while culture is not an irrelevant factor, according to Professor
Patterson, it is not the sole factor. It is not true, as he puts it, that
"nothing can be done about culture. This misunderstanding springs
from the view of culture as something immutable."119
As scholars have observed, "culture is not an independent
variable. It is influenced by numerous other factors, for example,
geography and climate, politics, the vagaries of history."120 The
relationship between culture and other factors might be a two-way
one.121 Culture influences institutions - "culture is the mother
and . . . institutions are the children"122 - and vice versa. Douglass
1 14. Michael E. Porter, Attitudes, Values, Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity,
in CULTURE MATIERS, supra note 35, at 14, 24.
115. Id.
116. Patterson, supra note 104, at 212.
117. Id. at 218.
118. Id. at 208 (quoting Ward Goodenough, Culture: Concept and Phenomenon, in THE
RELEVANCE OF CULTURE 93, 97 (Morris Freilich ed. 1989)).
119. Id. at 204.
120. Harrison, Why Culture Matters, supra note 102, at xxviii; see also JARED DIAMOND,
GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL 417-19 (1997) ("[C]ultural factors and influences . . . loom
large. . . . Some of that cultural variation is no doubt a product of environmental
variation . . . . A minor cultural factor may arise for trivial, temporary local reasons, become
fixed, and then predispose a society toward more important cultural choices . . . . ").
121. Patterson, supra note 104, at 208 ("[A] cultural explanation does not preclude
social causes. Often what's most interesting and useful in any analysis is to identify and
disentangle the complex explanatory interplay between cultural and non-cultural factors, an
interplay in which both sets of factors can be both independent and dependent in one's
causal model.").
122. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program? in
CULTURE MA TIERS, supra note 35, at 65, 75; see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 117 (1990). In explaining the
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North's work on institutions suggests that informal constraints that
"come from socially transmitted information [that is] a part of the
heritage we call culture" exist and affect institutional development.123
In this respect, " [c]ultural norms and beliefs can be seen as the deepest
level of institution, and thus the same framework can illuminate the
role of cultural differences in economic performance."124Although
some scholars have found cultural differences between the Italian
North and South to be at the root of poverty and social pathology in
the South,125 they have also attributed Italy's decision to decentralize

different developments that have taken root in the former colonies of Britain and Spain in
the Americas, North noted that "(i]n the former, an institutional framework has evolved that
permits the complex impersonal exchange necessary to political stability and to capture the
potential economic gains of modern technology. In the latter, personalistic relationships are
still key to much of the political and economic exchange." Id. Similarly,
[a]Ithough formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions,
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more
impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural constraints not only connect the past with
the present and future, but provide us with a key to explaining the path of historical change.
Id. at 6.
123. NORTH, supra note 122, at 37. For a discussion of New Institutional Economics and
how different institutional arrangements or governance structures play a part in determining
the cost and benefit associated with the transaction, see Cao, Looking at Communities and
Markets, supra note 85, at 865 n.86. New Institutional Economics is closely associated with
Ronald Coase's transaction cost economics. It recognizes that economic actors incur
extensive transaction costs, including screening, monitoring, enforcement, and opportunity
costs. Given these costs, the type of institutional arrangement adopted by the parties will
have an effect on whether these costs will be high or low. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-42 (1985).
124. Christopher Clague & Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Preface to ANNALS, Jan.
2001, at 8, 10.
125. See, e.g. , ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS
IN MODERN ITALY (1993) [hereinafter PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK]. Putnam
found that civic culture made all the difference in northern Italy, where networks of
associations and the norms of trust they produce helped overcome collective action
problems and made individuals and groups more productive. Id. at 181-82. Putnam
concluded that:
Success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action and the self-defeating opportunism that
they spawn depends on the broader social context within which any particular game is
played. Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock
of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement.
Id. at 167. Similarly,
[w]here people know one another, interact with one another each week at choir practice or
sports matches, and trust one another to behave honorably, they have a model and a moral
foundation upon which to base further cooperative enterprises. Light-touch government
works more efficiently in the presence of social capital.
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 345-46 (2000). Social capital refers to "features of social organization, such as
trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions." Id. at 167; see also BANFIELD, supra note 90, at 85 (describing the
people of the Montegrano district in southern Italy as subscribing to a norm of "amoral
familis(m]" whereby one should "[m]aximize the material, short-run advantage of the
nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise").
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public policy and administration and promote civil society in the 1970s
as crucial in the promotion of trust in the South.126
Given the relationship between culture and institutions, one might
ask whether changing culture may change both institutions and the
course of institutional development. Some societies have embarked on
culture change. Although Confucian countries, with their emphasis on
familial relations and loyalties, tend to be fairly corrupt, political
leadership under Lee Kwan Yew has made Singapore one of the least
corrupt countries in the world, ranking it in the same league as
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and New Zealand.127 Germany and Japan,
following World War II, went from two of the most militaristic
countries in the world to two of the most pacifist.128
Japan, in fact, has undergone several periods of self-imposed
cultural transformations. When faced with Western military might in
the late 1800s, the country embarked on an intensive period of
systematic culture change.129 Known as the Meiji Restoration, the
Japanese, realizing they did not compare favorably "with the more
progressive powers of the world,"130 decided to modernize by bringing
foreign experts to Japan and sending Japanese agents abroad. This
restoration was conducted as a "revolution from above" aimed at
modernizing to defend the country from Western threat.131 The Meiji
Restoration has been described as a movement to "learn[ ] the ways of
the West in order to reform virtually every aspect of national life."132
Japan modeled its military and legal codes and bureaucracy after
Germany's. It undertook systematically to perform the basic functions
of government, such as establishing a national postal service, public
education for boys and girls, and universal military service. These
126. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 125, at 181-85.
127. Huntington, supra note 35, at xv-xvi.
128. During World War II, Japan, for example, was a country that sent its men on
suicide missions with the imperial rescript, "Duty is heavier than a mountain, while death is
lighter than a feather." Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Heads to Iraq, Haunted by Taboo Bred in
Another War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al. By contrast, postwar Japan's official attitude
toward death was markedly different. As the government capitulated to demands of
hijackers of a Japan Airlines plane in 1977, the then prime minister explained, "Human life
is weightier than the earth." Id. After World War II, Japan's U.S.-imposed constitution,
which prohibits the use of force for the resolution of disputes, has been fervently embraced
by the Japanese.
129. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion of Japan's Meiji Restoration is drawn from
Landes, supra note 93, at 7-10.
130. Sidney Devere Brown, Okubo Toshimichi: His Political and Economic Policies in
Early Meiji Japan, 21 J. ASIAN STUD. 183-197 (1962) (quoting Okubo Toshimichi).
131. Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the "Developmental State"?: Administrative Procedure
Reform in Japan and Korea, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 588 (2001).
132. Bill Ong Hing, Nonelectoral Activism in Asian Pacific American Communities and
the Implications for Community Lawyering, 8 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 246, 248 n.16
(2002).
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measures, the latter two in particular, were designed to create a new
imperial state, to inculcate a sense of nationhood nonexistent during
the quarter millennium of Tokugawa rule, and, in the process, "to
imbue its subjects with a sense of higher duty to the emperor and
country and to link this patriotism to work."133 These measures were
not solely designed to transform political or economic institutions but
rather included a significant cultural component. Japanese schools
devoted substantial time to the study of ethics and taught students not
just various subjects but also discipline, order, and responsibility.
Every school had a picture of the emperor in an effort to achieve
national unity and transcend parochial loyalties that characterized the
period prior to the Meiji Restoration; on national holidays, throughout
the country and at the same time, the same ritual was performed in
front of the emperor's picture. 134
In other periods throughout its history, Japan has undertaken
extraordinary efforts to involve its people in various national cultural
projects.135 The process has been termed "social management" to
distinguish it from Western theories of social control and from the
Japanese emperor model, emphasizing instead the interactive nature
in which Japanese private groups cooperated with a strong,
interventionist state to formulate and implement programs to manage
society.136 During the Tokugawa or early modern era, from the 1600s
to the mid-1800s, authorities of the shogunate, through "kyoka," or
"moral suasion," exhorted peasants to "work hard, pay their taxes,
and avoid luxury. "137 This system was passed down to the leaders of
the modern Japanese state to embark on "an ongoing, managerial
process of persuading or teaching the masses to internalize
appropriate values. "138 Bureaucracies were established to run moral
suasion campaigns. Among the more notable include the Imperial
Rescript on Education of 1890, designed to catch up with the West by
fostering a sense of nation in the masses, calling upon subjects to be
loyal to parents and to the emperor, obey the laws, and offer
themselves to the state;139 and the Local Improvement Campaign of
1906 to 1918 to persuade villages and small towns not j ust to pay taxes

133. Landes, supra note 93, at 10.
134. LANDES, supra note 94, at 376.
135. SHELDON GARON, MOLDING JAPANESE MINDS 6 (1997).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 8. To foster a sense of nationhood and identification with the central state,
the Horne Ministry replaced the hamlets' Shinto shrines with one state-supported shrine per
village. Id. at 9.
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but also to practice frugality and avoid indulgence.140 In the early
1920s, the Ministry of Education began the first of a successive series
of "daily life improvement campaigns" to introduce methods of
"scientific budgeting, better nutrition and hygiene, and avoiding
wasteful spending on festivals, alcohol, and tobacco. "141 The Home
Ministry, whose officials considered themselves "shepherds of the
people"142 ran welfare programs by coordinating private relief efforts
while trying to reform the norms and habits of the poor by cultivating
the spirit of " 'self-management' . . . a commitment to diligence, thrift,
and other good habits so that individuals and families would avoid
relying on public assistance."143 These various campaigns were run by
either the Home Ministry or the Ministry of Education,144 which
received reports from district chiefs containing detailed village-by
village information on time devoted to funerals and weddings, and in
the latter case, the numbers of attendees, the type of ceremony, and
the food served.145
These campaigns launched thousands of hortatory lectures by
officials and community leaders of women and youth groups, religious
organizations, and other civic associations. Methods used to
supplement moral suasion included motion pictures, handbills
distributed to households, and posters on public buildings exhorting
saving and frugality. In addition to welfare and thrift programs, the
moral suasion campaigns also took on three other programmatic areas
- religion, prostitution, and women's integration into civic life.146
These efforts were cooperative endeavors between the state and
outside groups to push the state toward "middle-class commitments to
the modernization of popular beliefs, daily habits, and gender

140. Id.
141. Id. at 11. The elimination of wasteful spending is generally viewed in development
economics as an important step in capital formation and accumulation. In Economic
Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, Arthur Lewis asked a question that
remains central in the field today: how to induce capital formation and how to transform
surplus capital into investment capital. See W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with
Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CLASSIC
PERSPECTIVES, CRITIQUES, AND REFLECTIONS 68, 75 (Rajani Kanth ed., 1994). To the
extent that the Japanese state successfully convinced the people to not waste money on non
economically productive activities such as funerals, weddings and other feasts, this strategy
fits squarely within the standard prescriptions for spurring economic growth. The tendency
in traditional economies is to spend surplus capital on "tombs, country houses, temples," id.
at 73. The key is to "tempt capital into productive channels rather than into the building of
monuments," id. , or on funerals and weddings and other lavish ceremonies.
142. Id. at 16.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 15-16.
145. Id. at 12-13.
146. Id. at 15-16.
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relations."147 Throughout the twentieth century, the Japanese middle
class began to regard the state as a progressive force and through
policy boards, community groups, and civic forums, embarked on
various forms of norm or culture change - eliminating the "evil
customs of the past,"148 introducing " 'scientific' methods of child
rearing to rural and lower-class women," joining with "Western
educated Protestant reformers . . . to teach the poor the virtues of hard
work, savings, and self-help" - all with the aim "to improve the diet,
hygiene, work habits, housing, consumption patterns, and ritual life of
the Japanese people."149 To catch up with the West, the Japanese
government
energetically disseminated an "emperor-system ideology" to the public,

inculcating patriotism,

loyalty

to the

emperor, and the virtues of

diligence and thrift. The state did so by utilizing a highly centralized set

of institutions: the national school system, the military, a network of

State

Shinto

associations150

shrines,

and

numerous

hierarchically

organized

while at the same time channeling the "Japanese people into active
participants in the state's various projects."151 Indeed, " [t)he cultural
values underlying Japan's successful strategy in catching up with the
West were nurtured and manipulated by the elites in the interest of
the developmental state;"152
In recent years, some nationals of Latin-American, African, and
Asian countries have pushed for a "cultural reorientation"153 of their
own countries. There are suggestions from those from the economi
cally developing regions154 that certain values are "development
prone" and "development-resistant,"155 and efforts are underway to
147. Id. at 19.
148. Id. at 20 (quoting the Meiji regime's Charter Oath of 1868).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Charlotte G. O'Kelly, ANNALS, Sept. 1996, at 176, 177 (book review).
153. Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 122, at 66.
154. To the extent that evaluations of culture and the movement for culture change
come from those "within" the culture, it may alleviate the concern that the push for culture
change is an act of cultural imperialism:
One reason is that we are chary of intervening in a culture to change its characteristics,
assuming we knew how. At a time when we think of all cultures as worthy of equal respect,
what justification would we have to intervene - whether that intervention is public or
private - and change a cultural feature that we think limits economic development?
Glazer, supra note 110, at 222.
155. Mariano Grondona, an Argentinean scholar, lists twenty cultural factors and
evaluates each to determine whether it is favorable or resistant to economic development.
Although neither the development-prone nor development-resistant typology, with the
twenty enumerated values, exists in the real world, Professor Grondona states that the
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identify systematically, in Latin America, values and attitudes that are
an obstacle to economic progress and to evaluate how such attitudes
are reflected in the ways six elite groups - the politicians, the
military, businesspeople, clergy, intellectuals, and leftists - express
themselves.156 Although the culture issue has been explored in
different periods of Latin-American history,157 in recent years it has
resurfaced with increased vehemence due to the collapse of
"dependency theory."158 As the celebrated Peruvian writer Mario
Vargas Llosa observed, reforms, economic or otherwise, in Latin
America cannot be successful
unless they are preceded or accompanied by a reform of our customs and

ideas, of the whole complex system of habits, knowledge, images and

forms that we understand by "culture." The culture within which we live

and act today in Latin America is neither liberal nor is it altogether

democratic. We have democratic governments, but our institutions, our

reflexes and our mentality are very far from being democratic. They
remain populist and oligarchic, or absolutist, collectivist or dogmatic,

flawed by social and racial prejudices, immensely intolerant with respect

to political adversaries, and devoted to the worst monopoly of all, that of
the truth.1 59

This idea that "economic development is a cultural process"1ffi has
gained intellectual ground in Latin America in recent years. That is to
say, " [t]he paradox of economic development is that economic values
are not enough to ensure it. Economic development is too important
to be entrusted solely to economic values. The values accepted or
categories are merely "ideal types, or mental constructs, that facilitate analysis because they
offer two poles of reference that help us locate and evaluate a given society." Mariano
Grondona, A Cultural Typology of Economic Development, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra
note 35, at 44, 53 (emphasis omitted).
156. Carlos Alberto Montaner, Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin America, in
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35, at 56, 57-58.
157. For a discussion of the various efforts in Latin America toward effectuating
changes in values and attitudes, see Lawrence E. Harrison, Promoting Progressive Cultural
Change, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 35, at 296, 297-99 [hereinafter, Harrison,
Promoting Progressive Cultural Change] (discussing works by eminent writers from
Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Spain, Peru, among others, that question whether
traditional Ibero-American values have a retarding effect on economic change in the
region).
158. Dependency theory generally holds that, given the structural power system
endemic to the international economic framework, developing countries are consigned to a
perpetual position of dependency on the industrialized, economically advanced country. See
Lan Cao, Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning? 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 545, 55154 (1997) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed., 1992)).
159. Harrison, Promoting Progressive Cultural Change, supra note 157, at 297-98
(quoting Claudio Veliz, THE NEW WORLD OF THE GOTHIC Fox: CULTURE AND ECONOMY
IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH AMERICA 190-91 (1994) (quoting Mario Vargas Llosa, America
Latina y la Opci6n Liberal, in EL DESAFfO NEOLIBERAL: EL FIN DEL TERCERMUNDISMO
EN AMERICA LATINA (Barry Levine ed. 1992))).
160. Grondona, supra note 155, at 46.
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neglected by a nation fall within the cultural field."161 Having the right
set of cultural values will allow a nation to resist temptations that are
appealing in the short term but are detrimental to long-term economic
development.162
The process of culture change is not limited to Latin America. In a
provocative article, a Cameroonian scholar questions the African
mindset163 that exalts the past rather than the future,164 views authority
and dominance as a status of birth rather than a position that could be
acquired,165 allows the community to subordinate the individual,166
celebrates conviviality to an excess and rejects open conflict, 167
believes in sorcery and witch doctors, and "attributes very little
importance . . . to the financial and economic aspects of life."168
Although African culture, according to him, is "one of the most - if
not the most - humanistic cultures in existence,"169 "peaceful cultural
revolutions"1 70 must be undertaken "to change Africa's destiny."m
One route through which culture change can be accomplished is
through the educational system, by "asserting the absolute
preeminence of education, by suppressing the construction of religious
structures and other palaces to the detriment of schools, and by
modifying the content of the curricula, accenting not only science but

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Despite the immense "diversity - the vast number of subcultures" in Africa, the
author believes that it is possible to generalize about African culture because "there is a
foundation of shared values, attitudes, and institutions that binds together the nations south
of the Sahara, and in many respects those to the north as well." Etounga-Manguelle, supra
note 122, at 67.
164. This means an absence of "dynamic perception of the future." Id. at 69.
165. This means that "(i]n Africa, you must be born dominant; otherwise, you have no
right to power except by coup d'etat." Id. at 70.
166. One of the byproducts of this norm is that "(t]he concept of individual
responsibility does not exist in our hyper-centralized traditional structures. In Cameroon,
the word 'responsible' translates as 'chief.' " Id. at 71. Another byproduct is that, without the
notion of individual responsibility, "those that occupy an intermediate position in the
hierarchy" are held in contempt, as it is understood that the one to solve a problem is only
the minister himself. Id. at 71.
167. This means "(f]riendship comes before business" and differences, even legitimate
ones, are suppressed in order to maintain social harmony. Id. at 72 "In some African
societies, the avoidance of conflict means that justice cannot be rendered in the daytime." Id.
168. Id. This means that "[o]ther than some social groups like the well-known Bamileke
of Cameroon or the Kamba of Kenya, the African is a bad H. economicus. " Id.
169. Id. at 75. African humanistic values include "the solidarity beyond age classification
and social status; social interaction; the love of neighbor, whatever the color of his skin; the
defense of the environment, and so many others." Id.
170. Id. at 76.
171. Id. at 75.
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especially the necessary changes of the African society. "172 The
African school could emphasize critical thinking, dissent, the
importance of creating "businesspeople, and therefore job creators,"
and transforming the role of women.173 To transform the economic
culture, " [w]e must accept profit as the engine of development."174
Since the Asian currency crisis of 1997, there is a similar effort to
change "the traditionally particularistic personal relationships that
have dominated the East Asian economies."175 For example, the
tradition of taking a "long view" meant many East Asian businesses
neglected to monitor the profitability of enterprises. "The supposed
virtue of such long-term perspectives was reinforced by the cultural
propensity to see great virtue in delayed gratification and the
willingness to suffer in the short run in the expectation that in time
there would be greater rewards for steadfastness. "176 Such values were
useful at the initial stages of development but created problems at the
later stages. Contrast this with the Western practice of quarterly
profit-and-loss statements to provide managers and investors with
information about whether capital is being allocated efficiently.
Such efforts to effectuate change resemble the Japanese efforts at
social management and have centered on educational reform. For
example, after determining that the primary difference between Japan
and Peru was that Japanese children learned progressive values and
Peruvian children did not, a Peruvian businessman established the
Institute of Human Development in 1990 to promote the "Ten
Commandments of Development: order, cleanliness, punctuality,
responsibility, achievement, honesty, respect for the rights of others,
respect for the law, work ethic, and frugality."177 In the past decade,
over two million Peruvian students have participated in Institute
sponsored courses. The Institute's works are being adopted outside of
Peru as well, by Nicaragua's minister of education in his own
educational reform projects and by Mexico's prestigious Monterrey
Institute of Technology and Higher Studies.178 Other c1v1c
organizations in several Latin-American countries focus on curricular
changes in the public-education system to promote wholesale changes
in certain cultural attributes.179

172. Id. at 76.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 77.
175. Harrison, Why Culture Matters, supra note 102, at xxiii.
176. Pye, supra note 93, at 253.
177. Harrison, Promoting Progressive Cultural Change, supra note 157, at 303.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 304-05.
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Lest one too blithely disparages efforts to institute change through
the educational system, it is important to note that scholars have long
studied how "education constructs culture."180 The works of Pierre
Bourdieu demonstrate "the central role that schools have in both
changing and in reproducing social and cultural [structures] . . . from
one generation to the next."181 As Bourdieu explains: " [i]f it be
accepted . . . that culture . . . is a common code enabling all those
possessing that code to attach the same meaning to the same words,
the same types of behavior and the same works," then "it is clear that
the school . . . is the fundamental factor in the cultural consensus in as
far as it represents the sharing of a common sense which is the
prerequisite for communications."182 Cultural traditions may also be
constructed - a process Eric Hobsbawm describes as "invented
tradition," defined as "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly
or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek
to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition,
which automatically implies continuity with the past."183 Again,
education would play a vital role in the reshaping of such cultural
traditions
whether to promote frugality, trust, delaying
sacrificing
for the national interest, the time value of
gratification,
money - by adopting "a process of formalization and ritualization"184
and "organizing cultural productions,"185 as undertaken by Japan
during the Meiji Restoration.
Although the degree of the state's involvement may vary, in terms
of "official encouragement, outright subsidies, and governmental
coordination,"186 there is currently a concerted effort in some
developing countries to engage in culture change. This process
includes the construction of social capital through educational reform
and various forms of civic participation which resemble the earlier

180. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 974
(1996).
181. Id. at 973 (alteration in original) (quoting Richard Harker, Bourdieu - Education
and Reproduction, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF PIERRE BOURDIEU: THE
PRAcnCE OF THEORY 86 (Richard Harker et al. eds., 1990)).
182 Id. at 973-74 (second and third omissions in original) (quoting Pierre Bourdieu,
Systems of Education and Systems of Thought, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS 159, 161 (Earl Hopper ed., 1971)); see also id. at 975 (describing
how education is a vehicle for government norm management). Lessig states that
"[e]ducation thus proceeds (1) through a practice, (2) directed by an authority, (3) that
coerces - without appearing to coerce." Id.
183. Id. at 978 (quoting Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE
INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983)).
184. Id. (quoting Hobsbawm, supra note 183, at 4).
185. Id. at 982 (quoting Mary Crain, The Social Construction of National Identity in
Highland Equador, 63 ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 43, 56 (1990)).
186. GARON, supra note 135, at 235.
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efforts of the Japanese. One could imagine other possibilities, even
those that conjure the "image of a meaning manager, or meaning
architect, who has identified a social meaning that is to be
transformed, and must find the techniques to achieve this
transformation."187 Post-Soviet Russia or Malaysia, for example, could
change the meaning of what it is to be a Russian or a Malaysian
through the technique of "tying," as Lawrence Lessig puts it, by
associating one act with "another social meaning that conforms to the
meaning that the architect wishes the managed act to have. " 188
Through education and coordination with other civic organizations,
these governments could promote an inclusive understanding of
citizenship and tie the Chinese and Jews to the Malay and Russian
identity respectively by emphasizing the long history of both ethnic
groups in Russia and Malaysia and their contribution to the economy
through the government's wealth taxation for redistributive
purposes.189 If what it means to be a Malaysian or a Russian is socially
constructed and if " [s]ocial meanings are collective goods, and
collective action is needed (sometimes, at least) to change collective
goods,"190 public education may be necessary to alter such social
meanings. The use of rituals may also help by promoting the desired
form of tyings191 because "rituals serve to coordinate individuals in
support of a new meaning."192 Thus when the Japanese government
wished to inculcate a sense of national identity, it resorted to various
emperor-centric rituals and mandated that they be performed daily in
school.193 Similar political rituals have been used in the United States,
as when West Virginia required children to stand and salute the flag in
school.194 Development could also be tied to certain attributes, for
example, frugality or a future orientation, with all Malaysians
exhorted to adopt and internalize such attributes because they are
Malaysian attributes. The government would avoid tying such
attributes to the Chinese and avoid telling the Malays to act "more
Chinese,"195 as it has done - such tying would merely identify these
attributes as intrinsically Chinese and hence foreign.
187. Lessig, supra note 180, at 1008.
188. Id. at 1009.
189. The Soviet Union itself embarked on a self-conscious campaign to discourage the
use of motorcycle helmets - made in Western Europe - by tying such use to the stigma of
imperialism. Cartoons vilifying helmet wearers appeared in newspapers, and soon Russians
dared wear helmets only at night to avoid detection. Id. at 965.
190. Id. at 1022.
191. Id. at 1013-14.
192. Id. at 1016.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 150.
194. Lessig, supra note 180, at 1014.
195. See supra note 101.

1080

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:1044

Tying as a technique to produce or alter social meanings may
transfer positive as well as negative associations. Indeed, politicians in
Malaysia and post-Soviet Russia have sought to vilify the Chinese and
Jews respectively as outsiders whose wealth ought to be "returned" to
the true indigenous nationals. In these demagogic campaigns, the
government tied Chinese to not Malaysian, or Jews to not Russian.
Government efforts to change social and cultural meanings may of
course be viewed pejoratively as a troubling "industrial policy for
norm generation" resulting in "boundless and oppressive state efforts
to manipulate social norms. "196 They might seem all the more
"chilling"197 when undertaken by liberal states that do not as a matter
of course engage in propaganda or brainwashing. Yet, as some have
noted, such efforts may be more commonly pursued by governments,
including the United States, than one may initially realize.198 The
former Soviet Union is another example of " 'consciously shaped and
directed' cultures"199 whereby "rituals served as an 'instrument of
cultural management enabling political elites . . . to gain acceptance
for a general system of norms . . . congruent with their interpretation
of Marxism-Lenism.' "200 In a manner reminiscent of the works
performed by Japan's Home Ministry during the Meiji Restoration,
the Soviets, too, established " [r]itual specialists . . . 'local organizers
and administrators of the Party, the Komsomol, the trade unions and
the local soviet' "201 to engage in social and cultural reconstruction,
often through "an extensive 'advertising' campaign."202 " Governments

196. Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2055, 2057, 2060 (1996).
197. Lessig, supra note 180, at 1008, 1016.
198. Even in the United States, for example, despite proclamations that the government
does not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion," id. at 945 (quoting Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-28
(1985) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))), the U.S.
government, as well as governments elsewhere, regularly:
(A]ct to construct the social structures, or social norms, or . . . the social meanings that
surround us. For these social meanings are what is orthodox. They constitute what is
authority for a particular society, or particular culture. To the extent that they are built, or
remade, or managed by government, then to that extent government is 'prescribing' the
orthodox.
Id. at 947 (emphasis omitted). One example of government transformation of norms for
progressive purposes is the Civil Rights Act, which altered the cultural landscape by
providing a cultural and legal safe harbor for businesses that served black customers; by
making discrimination illegal, the law allowed a business who served blacks to be viewed as
doing so in order to obey the law, not necessarily to favor blacks. Id. at 966.
199. Id. at 983 (quoting CHRISTEL LANE, THE RITES OF RULERS: RITUAL IN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY - THE SOVIET CASE 1 (1981)).
200. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting LANE, supra note 199, at 25).
201. Id. at 984 (quoting LANE, supra note 199, at 26).
202 Id. at 985 (quoting LANE, supra note 199, at 50).
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trade on standing social meanings to advance state ends,"203 which
have ranged, in the United States, from promoting "family values" to
exclude homosexuals from social integration to, in the former
Yugoslavia, constructing race and ethnic identities to build up
nationalism.204 And depending on the state's efforts to produce and
reshape social and cultural norms, this effort may raise the specter of
"thought control,"205 especially if the government allows few other
channels for competing value systems, or if the government backs up
its agenda with coercive forms of state action, as in North Korea or
Cultural Revolution China.
Given the primacy of culture change in this Section, it is important
to clarify what it is I am not arguing. I am clearly not claiming "that
cultural managers could construct any culture they wish or that 'given
the right social context, any social activity can be turned into a ritual at
the whim of ritual specialists.' "206 "Rituals, and the reality they
construct, depend on the values of the parties to that ritual."207 I am
also not arguing that "backward" cultures are the universal cause of
economic underdevelopment. But I am suggesting some relationship
between culture and economic productivity - the degree to which a
relationship exists will depend the particularities of history,
economics, and politics. Acknowledging such a link, however, does not
mean that culture is used to "deflect[) attention from other factors
which might provide an equally compelling explanation of
underdevelopment."208 The World Trade Organization and other
institutions of the international economic system may in fact be
structurally problematic, as evidenced by the exclusion from WTO
rules, until recently, of textiles and agriculture, two areas where
developing countries have a comparative advantage. Exploring the
relationship between culture and economics should in no way detract
from efforts to expose the structural biases against poor countries or
promote a "colonialist ideology that views the North as rightly and
naturally dominant over the South"209 or the South as an " Orientalized
Other" to the North. The point is not that some cultures are
intrinsically better than others; it is rather simply that certain attitudes,
203. Id. at 957.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 945 (quoting Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328
(1985)).
206. Id. at 986 (citation omitted) (quoting LANE, supra note 199, at 14).
207. Id.
208. Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality in the International Economic Order: Critical
Race Theory and Postcolonial Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8
(1999). I thank Professor Thomas for sharing her thoughts on culture and economic
development with me.
209. Id. at 6.
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inclinations, norms, and behaviors impede or promote economic
growth and if a group or nation so chooses, it could take steps toward
promoting culture change.
If, howeyer, a country or ethnic group is unwilling, for whatever
reason, to engage in culture change, there are other options for
addressing extreme imbalances in ethnic wealth concentration besides
affirmative action in favor of ethnic majorities and discrimination
against ethnic minorities. Aside from the normative question of
whether it is just to discriminate against ethnic minorities because they
are "too" rich or "too" economically powerful, government actions
that single out an ethnic minority and perpetuate the perception that
this minority is an outsider whose advancement needs to be restrained
simply are not in the country's long-term interest - if for no other
reason than the strategic reason that the ethnic minority is the group
with the much-needed economic as well as social capital.210 Ethnically
biased corrective remedies are likely to highlight ethnic differences,
with the government actively dividing the country, at the very least
psychologically, into ethnic insiders and ethnic outsiders, making
ethnic consciousness a perpetual source of division in the national
psyche.211
B.

Market Concentrations and Ethnic Stratification

Despite the prevailing view in the New Institutional Economics
literature212 that market-dominant ethnic minorities are merely a
symptom of institutional underdevelopment that would disappear
once institutional reforms are undertaken to reduce reliance on
personalized exchanges,213 there is strong, credible evidence the
phenomenon would persist. Several factors are important in the
analysis of why market-dominant minorities will continue to exist
under free-market conditions. First, as already discussed, certain
ethnic groups are advantaged by their access to social-capital networks
that cushion such groups from external discrimination; state
discrimination may prompt a group to turn to entrepreneurship in
their own ethnic economies, causing an increase in the group's social
capital endowment and making �ts members compete more fiercely

210. When Malaysia was hit by an economic crisis in 1998, Malaysian anti-Chinese
policies had to be modified and the government had "to sacrifice programs and policies once
considered unassailable." Joseph Kahn, Ethnic Chinese in Malaysia Can Buy Big Equity
Stakes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at D4.
211. Van Alstyne, supra note 14, app. & epilogue at 1556-64.
212. For a general overview of New Institutional Economics, see Cao, Looking at
Communities and Markets, supra note 85, at 865-74.
213. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 334-35.
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and efficiently.214 Second, certain ethnic groups may continue to
benefit because of discrimination in their favor,215 as may be the case
involving whites in South Africa, without triggering the mechanisms
for market correction,216 especially if there are barriers to entry and
little competition,217 as may be the case for many developing-country
markets. And third, persistent ethnic disparities may be "locked in" as
a result of monopoly power or anticompetitive conditions. This
Section focuses on the third explanation.
A substantial body of scholarship argues that first producers who
enjoy increasing returns gain a certain self-reinforcing and almost
insurmountable advantage over other producers.218 Markets with
positive feedback loops allow those with an initial advantage to feed
that advantage back onto itself through circular market mechanisms
and market networks,219 which "create increasing returns because of
the potential for connecting to other users through a common
standard."220 Initial advantages may result in path dependence and the
establishment of a prevailing standard, and as supporting institutions
are designed around the network standard, it becomes entrenched.221

214. Id. at 345, 353.
215. Id. at 340-45 (discussing the conditions under which "discrimination may increase
the relative income of an ethnic group that is a numerical minority"); id. at 342.
216. G�ry Becker argued that the market will drive out discriminating practices and
institutions because indulgence in a "taste" for discrimination is costly for the discriminator.
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 43-45 (2d. ed. 1971). To explain
why this might not occur, scholars have pointed to market irregularities to explain the
intransigence of racial disparities. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination
Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2596 (1994)
(discussing how transaction costs may interfere with market functions); McAdams, supra
note 85, at 1046-48 (arguing that market forces are not strong enough to overcome group
based social norms aimed at furthering group status); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't
Stop Discrimination, in FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 151, 153-54, 157-58 (1997).
217. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 342.
218. Id. at 348-51.
219. An example is the computer-related market. The dominant operating system,
currently Windows, attracts software authors to write Windows-compatible programs,
attracting future users to choose Windows because it offers the largest array of available
software, reinforcing Windows' lead, and the cycle continues. Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to
Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 732-33 (2000).
220. Id. at 733. The Windows network would consist of software writers, computer
users, and computer manufacturers.
221. Id. at 733-34, 742-53. Douglass North describes how a network structure of
institutions may be "locked in" by a set of rules that govern their interactions. Institutional
change would be impeded and influenced by "(1) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic
relationship between institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a consequence
of the incentive structure provided by those institutions and (2) the feedback process by
which human beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set." NORTH, supra
note 122, at 7.
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In the process, barriers to entry become high and initial advantages
become durable.222
The market lock-in analogy has been used to explore how racism
in the United States functions to foreclose competition and creates
barriers to entry.223 Scholars using antitrust and monopoly theory have
also described racism as a form of racial cartel that engages in
predatory behaviors for the benefit of members.224 Like cartels that
collude to bar the entry of new competitors, discriminatory groups
developed norms to exclude nonwhites and punished defectors by
ostracizing or boycotting them.225 These theories were developed with
the U.S. experience in mind, but may be general enough to apply to
cases in developing countries. Ethnically based trading networks,
initially formed to aid economically marginal minority groups,
may have grown "impenetrable"226 to outsiders, as the once-marginal
group becomes market dominant and continues to prefer members in
credit, hiring, and business-transfer decisions, including decisions
to engage in ethnically based "vertical and horizontal integration"227
that allow coethnic firms to "suck value out of each stage of a

222. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (describing the durability of feedback
loop monopolies in certain economic sectors).
223. Roithmayr, supra note 219, at 734-35.
224. Robert Cooter writes:
Just as producers collude to fix prices and obtain monopoly profits, so social groups
sometimes collude to obtain the advantages of monopoly control over markets. To enjoy the
advantages of monopoly, a social group must reduce competition from others by excluding
them from markets. In this way, the more powerful social group can shift the cost of
segregation to its victims, and more costs besides, so that the victims of discrimination are
worse off and the discriminators are better off.

Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 150 (1994)
[hereinafter Cooter, Market Affirmative Action]; see also McAdams, supra note 85, at 104648 (discussing how coercive norms police and deter defectors from racial cartels not for
economic but for social status).
225. Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, supra note 224, at 153-57.
226. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 348 (quoting MURRAY WEIDENBAUM & SAMUEL
HUGHES, THE BAMBOO NETWORK 29 (1996)).
227. Cao, The Diaspora, supra note 75, at 1582. Light and Gold write:
Horizontal integration involves ethnic business owners cooperating to choose store location,
avoid competitive pricing, pool information, and engage in collective buying. Vertical
integration occurs when a whole package of business services - ranging from credit,
wholesale goods, and maintenance to parking, transportation, real estate, manufacturing,
and import-export concessions - are provided

by coethnics.

LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 41, at 122. Note that sociologists such as Light and Gold use the
terms "horizontal integration" and "vertical integration" to convey a different meaning than
that understood in antitrust circles.
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product's movement toward the market, losing little or no value to
non-coethnic firms. "228
Whether due to intra-ethnic preferences and networks, vertical
and horizontal integration, or non-ethnic reasons, " [w]here productive
activity is characterized by increasing returns to scale, the first
producers to attain the level of output at which increasing returns
begin will obtain a potentially insurmountable advantage over other
producers."229 If these first producers are concentrated along ethnic
lines, the likely result is the perpetuation of the ethnic group's market
dominance.230
Market conditions in developing countries may enhance the
likelihood that productive activities will be characterized by increasing
returns to scale.231 Due to underdevelopment in social and
infrastructural services, for example, private firms cannot rely on the
state for electricity, telecommunications, or training but must instead
purchase their own; because the costs are high, large firms will be
advantaged because they can likely obtain these goods and services at
a lower average cost.232 Other reasons, such as a nontransparent
bureaucracy, poor accounting standards, and weak formal mechanisms
for information collection and contract enforcement, all tend to give
advantages to large, established firms with more resources to establish
and maintain the needed political contacts, obtain financing, or
provide collateral.233 Thus, "increasing returns to scale are prevalent in
developing economies [and are] consistent with the well-known fact
that large business groups dominate many developing economies."234
This tendency is likely to result in a "self-reinforcing
phenomenon. "235 If an ethnic group takes an early lead in the
production of certain goods and services, this initial advantage results
in group capture of such production where "production in the society
is characterized by increasing returns to scale."236 Members of the less
productive group may also be discriminated against regardless of their
228. Cao, The Diaspora, supra note 75, at 1582 (quoting LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 41,
at 12-13).
229. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 348; see also John W. Berresford, Mergers in Mobile
Telecommunications Services: A Primer on the Analysis of Their Competitive Effects, 48 FED.
COMM. L.J. 247, 295 n.180 (1996) (defining increasing returns to scale as "when the average
cost of producing a product or service falls as the quantity of the product or service produced
increases").
230. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 348.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 348-49.
233. Id. at 349.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 350.
236. Id.
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actual productivity due to imperfect information,237 discouraging them
from investing in necessary skills if they believe such investment
would be fruitless in the face of discrimination.238
Against such background conditions, certain standard remedies are
available to address ethnic stratification, including investing in a
transparent legal regime to lower the costs of screening, monitoring,
and enforcing contracts to encourage established businesses to trade
with members of the non-market-dominant ethnic group, or
establishing credit bureaus to provide credit to the less economically
productive group. In the following section, I explore how competition
laws may break up market concentrations, enhance competition, and
reduce barriers to entry in an ethnically neutral manner.
1.

Antitrust

There are currently, at least in the United States, two competing
views about the objectives and scope of antitrust policy. One view
asserts that antitrust has traditionally reflected a distrust of
concentrated economic power because market concentrations are
equated with lessened competition, inter-firm collusion, higher prices,
exploitation of consumers, political domination, and squeezing out of
small businesses.239 Scholars who espouse this view claim that this
vision of antitrust has for years been reflected in Supreme Court
decisions declaring that "Congress sought to prevent industrial
concentration for social, political, and economic reasons."240 Antitrust
was also concerned about preserving diversity and this concern was
appropriately reflected in merger injunctions and laws against vertical

237. Id.
238. Id. at 351.
239. Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the
European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981,
983 (1986) [hereinafter Fox, Monopolization and Dominance]; Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence
A. Sullivan, Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where
A re We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 942-43 (1987).
240. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 239, at 942-43 & n.38 (citing to United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat') Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 362-63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23, 328-34 (1962)). In
the 1960s and 1970s, efforts to deconcentrate markets were not opposed, except when the
target firms had expanded through natural, internal growth and not through abuse of
monopoly or oligopoly power. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 239, at 943-44.
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restraints.241 These concerns reflect distrust of concentrated power,
preference for diversity, and "opportunity for the unestablished."242
The second view, referred to as the Chicago School of antitrust,
rejects non-economic factors such as diversity or social welfare and
focuses instead on consumer welfare and efficiency concerns. 243
Chicago School scholarship sets out to demonstrate that certain
practices viewed with suspicion by many in the first camp, such as
tying arrangements and vertical integration, have wealth and
efficiency effects.244 Overblown concerns about market dominance and
monopolization have meant a failure to realize that many forms of
joint ventures (other than naked-price and market-allocation
agreements) may be beneficial.245 For the most part, Chicago School
scholars believe that markets are more vibrant and robust than
generally thought and that they tend toward a competitive equilibrium
for the most part without government intervention or judicial efforts,
which are likely to be inept and counterproductive. This is because
effective competition requires fewer competitors than generally
believed and, even if competition is not presently sufficient, any
attempts at monopoly profits,246 output restrictions,247 or predatory

241. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 239, at 944. For a hostile view toward vertical
integration, see ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 432 (1936)
(claiming that "[v]ertical integration may diminish the responsiveness of the firm to changes
in knowledge of methods of production").
242. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 239, at 944. These scholars could find support for their
position in the Supreme Court's statement that the Sherman Act is the "Magna Carta of free
enterprise." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
243. See, e.g. , ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 3-1 1 , 81-89, 107-15 (1978). Bork argues in favor of efficiency and maximization of
consumer welfare and states that consumer welfare should be the "exclusive" goal of
antitrust. Id. at 61; see also 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW 'II 'II 100- 1 13 (2d ed. 2000) (arguing in favor of an efficiency-based antitrust law and
against the inclusion of populist antitrust philosophy of the 1960s that protected inefficient
businesses; economic efficiency is the paramount consideration); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 18-22 (1976); William H. Page, Optimal
Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2151, 2151-56 (1990).
244. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1698
(1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy]; Richard A. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925-33 (1979). For example,
Chicago scholarship denounced the leverage theory of tying, which condemned tying on the
grounds that a firm with one monopoly in the tying product could leverage this monopoly to
create a second monopoly in the tied product, allowing it to earn two monopoly profits
instead of one. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.6a (2d ed. 1999).
245. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Marke: Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
246. Monopolies are viewed "not as the existence of a single seller but as freedom from
the threat of entry, typically as the result of a state-granted privilege." William H. Page,
Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1991)
[hereinafter Page, Ideological Conflict].
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pricing will be impeded by new entry, assuming the presence of an
efficient capital market.248 Cartels also will not be sustainable because
of the inherent pressures on members to defect.249 Contrary to populist
concerns, the Chicago School believes that government interventions
should be limited to practices such as naked price fixing or market
division. More aggressive intervention, particularly intervention aimed
at advancing non-economic values, bans practices that cannot harm
consumers and therefore destroy socially beneficial cooperation.250
Which view is correct, either for the United States or for
developing countries, is beyond the scope of this Review. Different
countries may at different stages choose and emphasize different
objectives deemed most suitable for them given their history, culture,
and social or market conditions. More than ninety countries have
competition laws either already in place or in draft.251 There is no
consensus in the world antitrust community as to what constitutes
"good" versus "bad" antitrust law.252 There is diversity in antitrust
laws even among advanced, industrial economies, for example,
between the European Union and the United States.253 In many
247. The Chicago School is critically concerned with market power if it means power to
reduce output artificially, that is, by raising price above cost by a significant amount for a
significant period of time without losing customers. Consumer welfare is maximized when
output decisions are subject to competitive pressures that push price down to marginal cost
(including of course a reasonable return on capital investment). See, e.g. , 2 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 243, 'l[ 501; POSNER, supra note 243, at 23.
248. HOVENKAMP, supra note 244, § 2.2b; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust];
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 244, at 1700-01.
249. Page, Ideological Conflict, supra note 246, at 16.
250. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 248, at 4-9 (explaining how
inhospitality toward unexplained practices deprives the economy of beneficial practices).
Easterbrook writes:
When the collaborators possess no market power, either their cooperation is beneficial, in
which event it will flourish, or it is not, in which event it will die as rivals take the sales.
When the collaborators have no power, monopoly cannot be their objective, and we must
consider the more likely possibility that the arrangements create efficiencies.
Id. at 21; see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines Co., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Unless
the firms have the power to raise price by curtailing output, their agreement is unlikely to
harm consumers, and it makes sense to understand their cooperation as benign or
beneficial."); BORK, supra note 243, at 131 (explaining how anti-merger policy that banned
mergers where the trend toward concentration was in its incipiency would destroy wealth
creating transactions).
251. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, MODEL LAW ON
COMPETITION: UNCT AD SERIES ON ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAw & POLICY 9 box 1
TD/RBP/CONF.5/7 (2000).
252. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 239, at 956.
253. 2 JAMES R. ATWOOD, KINGMAN BREWSTER, & SPENCER WEBER WALLER'S
ANTITRUST & AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 16 (Spencer Weber Waller ed., 3d ed.
1997); Fox, Monopolization and Dominance, supra note 239, at 983, 1017-18. Some have
suggested that diversity among different antitrust regimes is desirable. John 0. McGinnis,
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developing countries, it is not uncommon to find " [g]overnment
regulations that restrict entry, pricing, and trade [which] often curb
new business development and distort the competitive process."254
Thus, in addition to any barrier to entry posed by the economic
dominance of a market-dominant ethnic minority, there are also
government-erected barriers to entry that, despite their persistence,
may not be readily apparent.255 Licenses, for example, could be
granted on a non-competitive basis, to politically connected firms or
preferred state-owned enterprises. Such competition-suppression
measures would need to be eradicated either through anti-corruption
laws, a policy of opening up the country to foreign direct investment,
or antitrust enforcement. While free trade does produce pro
competitive effects,256 it may be insufficient to deconcentrate certain
economic sectors dominated by an ethnic group. Free trade may
weaken barriers caused by government preferences for politically
allied businesses and foreign investors may provide competition for
the previously shielded government-linked or preferred businesses.
Foreign investors may even provide tough competition for market
dominant minorities, thereby eroding their economic entrenchment.
But foreign competition may instead join forces with market
dominant minorities through various cooperative arrangements,
resulting in an expansion, not erosion, of the ethnic minority's
dominance.
The Political Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
549 (2003).
254. William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in
Transition Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 265, 282 (2001).
255. Id. at 283-84. The complex, nontransparent tax system, for example, confers too
much discretion on tax officials, creates too many opportunities for corruption, and "deters
new business entry and expansion by existing entrepreneurs." Id. at 284. Similarly,
underdeveloped capital markets make it difficult for businesses to raise capital and thus
discourage new entry - perhaps except by market-dominant minorities with various
ethnically based sources of community credit, such as rotating credit associations. See Cao,
Looking at Communities and Markets, supra note 85. A heavily bureaucratic regime in many
developing countries also acts as an entry deterrent, as shown in the works of Hernando de
Soto. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD
WORLD (June Abbott trans., 1 989); Davis, et al., supra note 14, at 352; Kovacic, supra note
254, at 283.
256. For the view that free trade is preferred to antitrust as a means of creating
competition, see, for example, Robert D. Cooter, Market Modernization of Law: Economic
Development Through Decentralized Law, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 275, 306 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1 997) ("The pressure of
international competition is more reliable and relentlessly procompetitive than the activities
of antitrust officials. Developing nations can accomplish many goals of antitrust policy
through free trade without the state creating an enforcement bureaucracy. . . . Free trade is,
consequently, the best antitrust policy."). A free-trade-liberalization alternative to antitrust
enforcement would include the dismantling of tariff and nontariff barriers to facilitate
imports of foreign goods. The presence of imports would discipline producers of domestic
products. Kovacic, supra note 254, at 287.
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Thus, despite highly convincing normative considerations against
altering the ethnic composition of the entrepreneurial class,257
assuming it is a priority for certain developing countries to reduce or
eliminate ethnic disparities in entrepreneurship, the measures
discussed above would need to be combined with antitrust law, as
antitrust would be especially helpful in deconcentration efforts. If the
objective is to promote entrepreneurship among the non-dominant
ethnic groups, antitrust would be preferable to ethnically biased
market interventions such as corporate set-asides and equity
restrictions. Set-asides do not create entrepreneurs or help construct
social capital for the recipient, and equity restrictions are easily
bypassed by the use of front persons, as the Chinese regularly do in
Malaysia.258 Antitrust, on the other hand, could address the very issues
that surround the existence of market-dominant ethnic minorities, but
do so in an ethnically neutral way.
There are several avenues an antitrust agenda might pursue, and
for the purpose of the Review, I will pick three areas monopolization, predation, and vertical integration - to illustrate my
point. To the extent that ethnic networks, such as ethnically based
horizontal and vertical integration259 are impenetrable and
discriminate against outsiders, resulting in the perpetuation and
consolidation of ethnic stratification, antitrust provides useful tools.
Imagine scenario one, where a firm owned by a market-dominant
ethnic minority has monopoly power260 over some defined market.
This is the classic Sherman Act section 2 case in U.S. law and what
qualifies as improperly exercised actions would be up to the court or
legislature of the country to decide.261 A country could decide to adopt
257. Davis et al., supra note 14, at 353-54 (discussing efficiency and social justice reasons
for not altering the ethnic composition of ethnically homogeneous commercial elites).
258. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. When the government in Indonesia
gave select non-Chinese businesses the exclusive rights to import certain goods and access to
capital on favorable terms, many subsequently sold them on the informal secondary market
to "Indonesians of Chinese descent while pretending to retain control." Ahmad D. Habir,
Conglomerates: All in the Family?, in INDONESIA BEYOND SUHARTO 168, 173 (Donald K.
Emmerson ed., 1999). Such businesses were then run by the ethnic Chinese who made
periodic payments to the sellers for the political advantages of using indigenous-sounding
names on company documents.
259. See supra notes 54-57, 226-228 and accompanying text.
260. Indicators might be profit levels in excess of those found generally in the economy;
or the existence of a predominant share of the market. In the United States, when a firm's
market share is below 50%, courts are divided as to whether the plaintiff is foreclosed from
proving monopolization. 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW 'I[ 807d (2d ed. 2002).
261. Issues for consideration would include whether the company's dominance was the
result of normal methods or natural growth or, alternatively, the result of "unfair practices,"
predatory pricing, and other means to reduce competition (i.e., obtaining long covenants not
to compete from former rivals, obtaining exclusive contracts whereby producers promise not
to sell to rivals of the company, acquiring exclusive licenses for key patents).
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a "no fault" approach to monopoly law, whereby mere possession of a
monopoly would suffice for an antitrust violation, so that improper
conduct is unnecessary.262 Alternatively, it could decide that a
company that had a monopoly "thrust upon it," through "changes in
taste or in cost [driving] out all but one purveyor,"263 would not be
deemed guilty of illegal monopolization. Similarly, it could exempt
from antitrust prosecution monopoly power acquired through
"superior skill, foresight and industry. "264 The United States has
chosen the third approach.265
A country set on correcting the market dominance of an ethnic
minority might opt for a no-fault monopoly standard, which would
cast the widest possible net for addressing the monopolization of
certain markets by the market-dominant ethnic minority,266 regardless

262. See John J. Flynn, Statement to the Federal Trade Commission, 48 ANTITRUST L.J.
845 (1979) (advocating "no conduct" approach to monopolization doctrine, whereby proof
of monopoly would itself establish liability under section 2); Eleanor M. Fox, Monopoly and
Competition: Tilting the Law Towards a More Competitive Economy, 37 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 49 (1980) (same). The Supreme Court has declined to apply such a no-fault approach
to section 2 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966);
Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
263. 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 260, 'II 61lb (quoting United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429, 430 (2d Cir. 1945)).
264. Id. 'II 637a (quoting Aluminum Co. , 148 F.2d at 430). See also Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. at 570-71 (finding that the offense of monopolization would not be found in monopoly
derived from "growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historical accident").
265. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872
(2004).
266. Even though it is not entirely clear based on the language of the statute, one could
conclude this is the approach chosen by Indonesia. Chapter IV of the Indonesian
Competition Law prohibits controlling the production or marketing of goods or services
"which may lead to monopolistic practices and or unfair business competition." Prohibition
Against Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition, No. 5, ch. 4, art. 17(1)
(1999) (Indon.) [hereinafter Indonesia Competition Law] (emphasis added). This Jaw was
adopted on March 5, 1999, and became effective on March 5, 2000.
The possibility of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition migbt be
inferred if there are no substitutes available for the goods or services concerned or if a firm
or group of firms controls over fifty percent of a market segment of certain goods or
services. Id. art. 17(2)(a)-(c). The Jaw could be read to say that it prohibits business actors
from monopolizing (controlling the production or marketing of goods or services) whether
or not such action results in monopolistic practices. But see Antimonopoly Law Must Target
Cooperatives, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 29, 1999 (stating that the proposed competition Jaw not yet effective as of the date of the paper's publication - would not penalize a company if
"the company's market share was gained through efficient operations and the company does
not use its dominant position to restrict new entrants to the market"). For an assessment of
the Indonesian Competition Law, see Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and
Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J.
579 (2000). According to Professor Fox,
the competition law of Indonesia is infused with principles of equality of opportunity,
fairness, equal treatment, and a leveling of advantage. It could be interpreted as permitting
massive break-ups of conglomerates; it may permit enjoining any act that hurts a competitor
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of the reasons behind such dominance or even the harm that might
flow therefrom. The emphasis would be on market structure and
breaking up monopolies and oligopolies or high market
concentrations, not on the anticompetitive conduct that might create
or maintain such structures. In fact, this approach had been advocated
at one point by the Neal Report in the United States in 1969 and if
adopted would have required firms with more than fifteen percent of
the market to reduce their market share within a year, presumably by
raising prices and reducing output.267 In developing countries, this no
fault standard could be adopted in tandem with the stated objective of
dispersing power or maintaining small firms - even if doing so does
not maximize innovative or allocative efficiency.268 Whatever the
decision, it should be articulated in terms of markets and economics,
not ethnicity.269

or other trader, even by competition itself. But this need not be the interpretation. The
language of the Indonesian competition law is chameleon-like.

Id. at 592.
Interestingly and highly relevant to this Review, article 19 gives as examples of
monopolistic practices or unfair competition refusing or impeding firms from engaging in the
same business. The Elucidation further explains that this means that " [r]efusing or
preventing other business agents may not be conducted in an improper manner or on non
economic ground, for example owing to differences in ethnicity, racial background, social
status and so forth." Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition
supp. art. 19 [hereinafter Elucidation]. This could be read to prohibit various ethnically
based preferences practiced by ethnic networks, as described in Part IL
267. Phil C. Neal et al., Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy,
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REY., Winter 1968-1969, at 1 1 -12. Failure to do so would result in
divestiture. A court could order a firm with a persistently high share of the market to
"restrict output or advertising expenditures." Id. cmt. at 72; see also CARL KAYSEN &
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICIES: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 11 1-13
(1959).
268. A country's antitrust law could even find that a monopoly that expands
continuously to meet the demand for its product is unlawfully monopolizing and not merely
using superior skills. This view would be antithetical to that expressed in certain cases in the
United States, whereby the Federal Trade Commission determined that such behavior
should not be found to be in violation of section 2 because antitrust laws should not be used
to "block hard, aggressive competition that is solidly based on efficiencies and growth
opportunities, even if monopoly is a possible result." In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
(TiO,), 96 F.T.C. 653, 751 (1980).
269. South Africa's post-apartheid competition law contains a comprehensive array of
objectives beyond those that are efficiency based. The competition law is to take into
account the need "to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of
South Africans; [and] to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable
opportunity to participate in the economy." It does, however, also have an explicit ethnic
focus - "to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons." Competition Act, No. 89, ch. 1, 'JI 2 (1989) (S.
Afr.) . This law was adopted on October 30, 1998, and became effective September 1, 1999. A
Competition Tribunal may exempt for a specified term agreements otherwise prohibited by
the Competition Law if such agreements contribute toward certain favored objectives,
including the "promotion of the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by
historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive." Id. ch. 2, pt. C, 'JI 10. Under the
Act, "historically disadvantaged" persons are defined as individuals "disadvantaged by
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Remedies for monopolization may include divestiture: requmng
the monopolist to sell off its assets to separate firms that will compete
in the market, even if divestiture eliminates an efficient monopolist in
favor of a less efficient set of competitors. Assuming, however, that
the new firms with sufficient capital to purchase the monopolist's
assets are also owned by members of the market-dominant ethnic
minority, divestiture would not, by itself, result in ethnic
deconcentration. It could, however, encourage or facilitate new entry
by members of the economically disadvantaged group, because a
market no longer dominated by a monopolist may be easier to
penetrate than one that is. This is especially likely to occur if the
government supplements deconcentration efforts with an overall
policy aimed at helping smaller businesses compete. Indonesia's
competition law, enacted in 1999 at the urging of the IMF, specifically
states that one purpose of the law is "to ensure the certainty of equal
business opportunities for large-, middle-, as well as small-scale
business actors in Indonesia."270 The competition law even contains a
controversial exemption271 for small businesses and cooperatives,272on
the grounds that such an exemption was necessary because of an
inhospitable business environment.273 And since Suharto's overthrow,
the Indonesian government has made small business promotion a
priority of its economic development agenda.274 There have also been
unfair discrimination on the basis of race" before the adoption of the 1993 Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa. Id. ch. 1, 'lI 3, § 2.
South Africa is in a category by itself because the economic disparities originated from
"blatant invidious discrimination on the part of authoritarian or post colonial rulers," Davis
et al., supra note 14, at 354, and were legally sanctioned until very recently. This is not the
case with the typical middleman minorities, such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Jews in
Europe, or Indians in Fiji.
270. Indonesia Competition Law, supra note 266, ch. 2, art. 3(b).
271. Antimonopoly Law Must Target Cooperatives, supra note 266 (discussing that some
Indonesian economists are against such an exemption because all business activities should
be included on grounds of fairness and because excluding certain parties from the monopoly
law could impede the creation of a competitive market).
272. Indonesia Competition Law, supra note 266, ch. 9, art. 50(h)-(i); Adam Lunn &
Philippa Venning, SE Asia's New Focus on Competition Law, ASIA TODAY, Oct. 2002,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNWS File.
273. Antimonopoly Law Must Target Cooperatives, supra note 266.
274. See, e.g., Equity Rather than Ethnicity, Bus. TIMES (SING.), Apr. 8, 1995, at 3,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MWP File (rejecting race-based economic policy and discussing
measures such as a presidential decree to support small businesses in government
procurement, the special extension of credit to small businesses, and the creation of
"people's credit banks" to support new and medium-sized companies); Indonesia: Key
Policy Developments, HILFE COUNTRY REP., QUEST ECON. DATABASE, March 21, 2002, at
6 (describing the establishment of the Indonesian Recovery Fund and its objective of
promoting capital for small businesses); Tom McCawley, A People's Economy, ASIAWEEK,
Dec. 18, 1998, at 62 (discussing measures to support small businesses, such as the granting of
approximately $2.67 billion to the Ministry for Cooperatives for relending to small
businesses at a low interest rate of about sixteen percent), available at http://www.asiaweek.
com/asiaweek/98/1218/bizl.html; Derwin Pereira, I Want to Build a People 's Economy, THE
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concerted efforts to promote small business without adopting
ethnically biased policies.275 Indeed, Indonesia has moved to embrace
the ethnic Chinese as part of its heritage276 and cease government
promotion of ethnic differences, due perhaps to a desire to seek
investments from mainland China.277 In any event, Indonesia's
Competition Law avoids any explicit mention of ethnicity, stating
merely that "there shall be no concentration of economic power in
particular business agents. "278
Scenario two, predatory pricing, is linked to scenario one,
monopolization, under U.S. antitrust law. Assume that an ethnically
owned monopolist is an aggressive competitor. Because predatory
conduct might resemble competitive conduct (for example, cutting
prices or introducing new products in response to or in anticipation of
competition), one key factor in a predation case is whether the
defendant's behavior is aimed at the removal of competition and the
recoupment of monopoly profits. A country dealing with predation
has at least two choices: it could opt for narrow rules on the grounds
STRAITS TIMES (SING.), Dec. 24, 1998, at 22, LEXIS, Nexis Library, MWP File (describing
efforts by the Cooperatives Minister under President B.J. Habibie to "build an economic
democracy, a modern economy, where small businesses are the key element of the economic
structure").
275. Editorial, Own Up to Ethnic Problem, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 28, 1 997, at 4 (calling
for a rejection of a proposal by a government official "to preserve the businesses of pribumi
[indigenous, non-Chinese Indonesians] entrepreneurs by barring Chinese traders from
entering these sectors"); Pereira, supra note 274 (stating the then Cooperatives Minister's
belief that Indonesia should reject the Malaysian-style New Economic Policy of explicit
preferences for the Malays and discrimination against the Chinese because "Indonesia
rejects a system of politics and economics along ethnic lines"; the view during the Habibie
presidency was that small businesses, including Chinese-owned small firms, would receive
government aid); Keith B. Richburg, Indonesia's "Most Dangerous Man," WASH. POST,
Mar., 2, 1999, at All (discussing efforts by the then Cooperatives Minister to explain that
support for small businesses would also benefit the ethnic Chinese because "[m]ost Chinese
businesses are small").
276. Alan Sipress, Ancient Dragons Rise in Indonesia, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2003, at A18
(reporting that, after years of suppressing Chinese culture, the Indonesian government,
under President Megawati Sukarnoputri, declared Chinese New Year to be a national
holiday).
277. Megawati Seeks Investments from China, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 26, 2002.
278. Indonesia Competition Law, supra note 266, pmbl. § c. During discussions of
various draft versions of the anti-monopoly legislation, there was a proposal that a phrase
"especially for pribumi" (indigenous, non-Chinese Indonesians] be inserted. The motion for
the insertion of such phrase was ultimately defeated. McCawley, supra note 274. But see
Elucidation, supra note 266, 'll 'll 4-5. The following sentences might be interpreted as an
oblique reference to the ethnic Chinese:
Businessmen close to the ruling elite have enjoyed excessive facilities, a situation leading to
widening social gaps. . . .
[T]he above-mentioned situation and condition [has] demanded . . . that we observe and
rearrange business activities in Indonesia . . . [in order to] avoid the concentration of
economic power in certain individuals or groups . . . .
Id.
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that predation is rare and rarely successful,279 or for broader rules on
the grounds that the mere threat of predation may allow a firm to
gamer monopoly profits. Of course, the choice between different
predation regimes may also be a normative choice.
Under the first view, to carry out a predatory pricing scheme
successfully, a firm would need a large market share, allowing the firm
to lower its prices to drive out the competition.280 A firm, even a
dominant firm, would suffer significantly if it lowers prices to drive out
rivals. The monopoly profits it hopes to gain once rivals are driven out
would have to be high enough to make the initial losses worthwhile.
Additionally, to sustain such monopoly prices, the firm would have to
prevent the entry of new rivals. As a result, predation is rare.
Alternatively, a country might embrace a competing view that a
firm may enjoy monopoly profits by driving out or intimidating rivals.
The latter strategy of mere threat making is much less costly and is
likely to be successful as "(c]ompetitors are reluctant to provoke the
dominant firm that has shown its readiness to use strategic weapons.
Would-be entrants hesitate to risk entry into markets of habitual
predators. "281
If a country adopts an antitrust law that prohibits even no-fault
monopolies - monopolies achieved without resort to illegal means the logical conclusion would be that even pricing above cost could be
deemed predatory282 in attempted monopolization cases.283 Outside the
context of attempts to monopolize, whether predatory pricing exists or
what constitutes it would not matter much because being a monopoly
is already prohibited regardless of predation or other bad conduct.284

279. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)
("[P]redatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.").
280. For support for this view, see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 260, 'II 'II 723725; BORK, supra note 243, at 154.
281. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 239, app. at 979.
282. For example, this no-fault regime would consider the following pricing scheme to
be predatory: the predator prices below rivals' costs but above his or her own cost.
283. In the United States, section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns attempts to
monopolize. Attempted monopolization could cover anticompetitive conduct by a single
firm that does not have monopoly power. There must be a specific intent to monopolize, a
dangerous probability that it would succeed, and the defendant's conduct must be
anticompetitive (for example, engaging in predatory pricing). See Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). In the United States, because the mere attainment of
monopoly power is not illegal under section 2, the mere attempt to acquire such power
would not be prohibited. Thus the defendant in the United States must also have engaged in
misconduct that if successful would give it monopoly power.
But in a no-fault monopolization regime, misconduct would not be necessary. Even
above-cost pricing would likely be considered predatory, casting a wide net to ensure that
attempts to monopolize would not be successful.
284. On the other hand, if a country decides that a monopoly achieved by superior skill
(no reliance on predatory pricing) would not be prohibited by antitrust, then it would likely
favor a rule that permits a firm to price at or above its own average total costs. There are
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To the extent that predatory behavior is a contributing factor in the
market dominance of certain ethnic minorities, broad plaintiff
oriented rules concerning predation will allow for rivals to compete
effectively against dominant firms. Again, there is no guarantee that
the new rivals will come from the economically disadvantaged
majority group precisely because these are ethnically neutral
measures.
Scenario three involves the quite common practice, discussed in
Sections II.A-B, of integration - horizontally and vertically - along
ethnic lines. The antitrust laws of most countries prohibit horizontal
agreements - agreements among rival firms - to fix prices,285 divide
markets,286 or reduce output, so I will focus on vertical restraints.
Vertical restraints are agreements between firms at different levels of
the distribution chain, for example, agreements between a
manufacturer and its wholesalers or retailers, to engage in exclusive
dealings, tyings, or exclusive territorial agreements that allow the
retailer to sell only to customers within a designated territory. Vertical
restraints could also be arranged along ethnic lines, with a
manufacturer entering into certain agreements with coethnic retailers.
A country might view vertical restraints as benefiting competition.
But, within certain developing-country contexts,287 one might disallow
vertical restraints to open distribution channels for entrepreneurial
access,288 particularly to provide opportunities, though not guarantees,
for retailers from the economically disadvantaged ethnic-majority
group. If this were the primary concern, antitrust would similarly
disallow other vertical restraints that might be more favorably treated
under current U.S. law. Exclusive-dealing contracts that require a firm
to buy all of its supplies from a particular source might be prohibited.
For example, an exclusive-dealing vertical restraint might involve
promises by a retailer that it will stock only one manufacturer's brand

different rules for determining the existence of predatory pricing, based on the relationship
between the defendant's price and its costs, such as variable costs and fixed costs. See
generally 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 260, 'JI 723d.
285. Thus, if a group of ethnic-Chinese companies agree to maintain uniform prices and
to sell only to designated ethnic-Chinese wholesalers, this action would likely be prohibited
by most antitrust Jaws.
286. Market division makes it possible for each conspiring firm to set or raise prices, or
reduce output without fearing even the threat of competition from rivals.
287. In addition to the ethnic-based reason for disallowing certain vertical restraints,
there might also be economic reasons. In an industry prone to collusion, which may be more
likely in developing-country markets, vertical restraints used by manufacturers may facilitate
a manufacturers' cartel. For a discussion of factors to watch out for in determining whether
an industry is prone to collusion, see RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK,
ANTITRUST 335-40 (2d ed. 1981 ).
288. Older case Jaw in the United States took this approach. See, e.g. , United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-37 (1973).
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- such as selling only a particular brand of soft drink - or it might
involve a baker agreeing to buy all of its flour from a producer.
Although exclusive-dealing contracts can maximize efficiency because
having a guaranteed source of supply may induce retailers to invest in
promotional activities and manufacturers to invest in training, such
contracts may also foreclose access to retail markets and to sources of
supply for rival manufacturers and rival retailers respectively. New
firms, especially those owned by a member of the ethnic majority, may
not be able to enter a particular market because exclusive-dealing
agreements foreclosed a reliable supply of products. A strict anti
exclusive-dealing rule may be similar to one previously in effect in the
United States, in which the Court found an antitrust violation
whenever an exclusive dealing tied up a large amount of business and
foreclosed a significant volume of commerce, regardless of the effect
on competitive rivalry.289
The same reasoning may also lead a country to look unfavorably
upon tying arrangements in which a seller conditions the purchase of
one good or service on the buyer's purchase of another good or
service. Whether such an arrangement is prohibited by current
antitrust rules depends on many factors, as set forth in the following
test. The plaintiff must show that (1) the tie affects more than a de
minimis amount of interstate commerce; (2) the buyer was coerced
into buying the tied product as a condition of buying the tying product;
(3) the two products are separate; and (4) the defendant has economic
power in the tying market.290
Early cases in the United States involved tying efforts by owners of
a patented product seeking to tie a second article to the patented
article. In several cases, the Court was concerned that tying enabled
the defendant company to extend its monopoly power from the tying
product to the tied product or to leverage its monopoly in one market
for a monopoly in the other as well.291 Even where there was no
289. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949). This case was
effectively overruled by Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. , 365 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1961),
which found exclusive dealings unlawful only if they significantly foreclose the opportunity
for rivals to remain in or enter the market. The antitrust analysis could also focus on the
cumulative effect of all exclusive-dealing contracts in the relevant market and not just on the
particular contract at issue. In FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392
(1953), the Court barred the defendant from entering into contracts with 40% of the movie
theaters in a certain geographical area in which the latter agreed not to show commercials
from any other advertising agency. The Court did not focus only on the 40% of movie
theaters that were bound by the agreement. Also relevant to the Court's decision was the
fact that four firms with a combined market share of 75% all used exclusive-dealing
contracts.
290. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984).
291 . The tying product is the product the buyer wishes to purchase. The product the
purchaser is asked to buy in order to purchase the tying product is called the tied product.
For example, in Carbice Corp. ofAm. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., Dry Ice Corporation made
dry ice and specially lined cabinets for refrigerating foods chilled by dry ice. 283 U.S. 27, 32,
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possibility of monopoly profits in the tied product, the Court
nonetheless disallowed tying arrangements because it is
"unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market. The volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be
said to be insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the
arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious."292
Anticompetitive effects are presumed to exist if a certain dollar
volume is foreclosed in the tied market as a result of the tie. This per
se test was subsequently restated as requiring a showing that "a party
has sufficient economic power . . . to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product" and that "a 'not
insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce was and is affected" in
the tied product.293
As far as the tying market is concerned, a successful tying
challenge must establish that the defendant has economic power.
Under earlier cases, the Court held that such power might be inferred
whenever the defendant sells a uniquely desirable product.
Uniqueness "confers economic power . . . when other competitors are
in some way prevented from offering the distinctive product
themselves. "294 One case even found that "the requisite economic
power is presumed when the tying product is patented or
copyrighted."295 Later cases, however, have made it more difficult for
the plaintiff to show economic power.296
supplemented on other grounds, 283 U.S. 420 (1931). Dry Ice Corporation sold its cabinets
and dry ice on the condition both would be used together. Id. at 30. When it discovered that
Carbice sold its own dry ice knowing that it would be used with cabinets made by Dry Ice
Corporation, Dry Ice sued. Id. The Court rejected the claim because it was concerned that
"the owner of a patent for a product might conceivably monopolize the commerce in a large
part of unpatented materials used in its manufacture." Id. at 32; see also Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The International Business
Machines Corp. v. United States Court held that the grant of a patent did not allow the
patent holder to restrict the use of the machine to particular films owned by the patent
holder. 298 U.S. 131 (1936). The Court enjoined IBM from leasing its machines on the
condition that lessees buy their unpatented punch cards. Id. at 137. The Court noted
that commerce in the punch-card market involved more than three million dollars annually.
Id. at 136.
292. Int'! Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (citations omitted). Dollar
volume of business in the tied product was about $500,000 per year. Id. at 395.
293. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (quoting Int'/ Salt, 332 U.S. at
392). There was also concern that consumer's freedom of choice was being denied, whether
or not the tied product was being offered at a competitive price. This case arose under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
294. Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 n.2 (1969).
295. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448
F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of
Reason, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 77, 128 n.268 (showing that courts once treated any departure
from perfect competition as evidence of market power).
296. See, e.g. , United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (holding
that the seller did not have economic power so long as competing sellers could replicate the
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Although scholars have defended tying on a variety of efficiency
grounds297 and the Court has recognized that tie-ins may be a cost
effective way of bundling and selling a package of services,298 the
discussion above shows that the Court has also been concerned that
tying arrangements hurt competition and increase entry barriers.
Clearly, such concerns might be even more pronounced in developing
countries with presumably less functioning markets that are distorted
by cronyism, corruption, or political grants of special privileges and
characterized by an absence of true competition. In such
environments, courts and legislatures may adopt a strict per se rule to
ensure that tie-ins do not facilitate exclusion of rivals by those with
market power (to be defined to reflect national and local priorities, for
example, regarding deconcentration), especially if there is concern
about the overlap between market power and ethnicity.
So far I have been discussing inter-brand vertical restraints such as
exclusive dealings and tie-ins. But countries that want to address the
market dominance of ethnic minorities might also be concerned about
intra-brand restraints because they could implicate social concerns
that a developing country might choose to address. For instance,
maximum resale price maintenance ("RPM") imposed by a
manufacturer on a dealer could have the effect of ruining less efficient
dealers whose costs of doing business exceed the enforced price
ceiling.299 Maximum RPM, if allowed by antitrust, may have a
disparate impact on the less efficient, less commercially astute non
market-dominant majority and thus a developing country concerned
about their welfare would ban maximum RPM schemes.
Conversely, minimum RPM establishing a floor below which
dealers are not allowed to price a manufacturer's product could
tying product and sell close substitutes); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2, 18 (1984) (holding that plaintiff must establish real economic power in the tying market to
invoke the per se rule); Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959
F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane) (observing that trademarked product does not ipso
facto confer market power); see also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional
Economics, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Tying].
297. For an insightful defense of tying on the grounds that tied sales expand output and
result in a more efficient allocation of resources, see Meese, Tying, supra note 296, at 22-27.
298. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. The Court unanimously upheld a tying
arrangement whereby a large hospital required patients undergoing operations to use the
hospital's anesthesiologists. Five members of the Court reiterated the applicability of the per
se rule to tie-ins (four concurring Justices would have applied the rule of reason test) but
concluded that because the hospital did not have sufficient market power, attracting only
30% of patients in the district, the per se rule would not be invoked. They also found that
there were indeed two separate products but that the tie-in did not produce an adverse effect
on competition - rival anesthesiologists could practice in other area hospitals.
299. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (declaring maximum RPM unlawful
per se in part because such restrictions by the manufacturer could channel distributions
through a small number of large dealers). This case has been overruled by State Oil v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997) (analyzing maximum RPM under the rule of reason).
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actually protect inefficient dealers by preventing efficient dealers from
undercutting them. A country concerned with the welfare of
inefficient dealer may therefore wish to adopt a less hostile approach
towards minimum RPM.300
The discussion above makes one primary point - that ethnically
based economic concentrations and the underlying practices that
further such market dominance (such as horizontal and vertical
integration, networks, other intra-ethnic preferences such as exclusive
dealings and tie-ins) may be addressed in economic terms through the
establishment of antitrust laws. Antitrust cannot guarantee that
certain ethnic groups will be economically successful as entrepreneurs
because antitrust does not seek to alter market results. Nonetheless,
breaking up monopolies and prohibiting certain practices that tend to
result in the entrenchment of dominance should lower barriers to
entry, and, combined with active state support for small- and medium
sized businesses, should help give new rivals (including those from the
disadvantaged ethnic majority) a chance.
C ONCLUSION

The revival of the field of law and development, and since the
demise of the Soviet Union, the reliance on domestic and international
markets for the attainment of economic development have led to an
increased focus on the impact of markets on developing countries,
especially because of the presence of market-dominant ethnic
minorities in those countries. That market dominance correlates with
ethnicity has made the issue particularly pressing, given the volatility
of ethnicity and concerns about ethnic conflicts. As a result, a number
of approaches to rectify the problem of ethnic-minority market
dominance have been used and discussed. Malaysia adopts
preferences favoring the majority ethnic Malay, resulting in ethnically
based restraints against the ethnic Chinese in ways reminiscent of
restraints used historically against Jews throughout Europe. Professor
Chua's book supports Malaysia-type policies on grounds that such
measures are normatively just and strategically necessary for stability.
Others have argued instead that ethnic ownership and control of
business should not trigger governmental remedies designed to
reconfigure the ethnic composition of commercial elites,301 favoring
300. Minimum RPM was at one point viewed in the United States as a "fair trade" law
to be allowed because prescribing minimum prices for the resale of trademarked goods
would protect the smaller retailer from being put our of business by larger retail outlets,
especially those selling as "loss leaders" to attract business. See 1 THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTIRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 461 (Earl W.
Kintner ed., 1978). But current U.S. law treats minimum RPM schemes as per se unlawful.
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
301. See generally Davis et al., supra note 14.
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instead redistributive measures that work outside of and parallel to
the market rather than intervene in market functions to curtail an
ethnic group's market activities.302
In this Review, I have set forth two proposals. The first suggests
that greater attention be given to exploring the possibility of culture
change. This suggestion is based on a limited proposition - that if
economic development is linked to culture and may be aided or
impeded by culture, changing certain cultural practices and beliefs
would facilitate economic development. It does not involve normative
evaluations of any culture, nor does it attempt to assess the intrinsic
worth of any culture beyond the relationship between culture and
economics. Nor does it preclude examination of historical and
structural impediments to development.
The second proposal looks to antitrust as a tool to rectify market
dominance and concentrations of wealth in certain economic sectors.
Insights from New Institutional Economics support my claim that in
developing countries characterized by market imperfections,
underdeveloped legal regimes, and external hostility, private,
cooperative arrangements among members of the same ethnic group
allow the group to bypass imperfect conditions in the mainstream
market by using ethnic social capital to create economic capital. On
the one hand, the establishment of ethnic economies is part of the
group's efforts to address barriers in the open market. On the other
hand, once the group succeeds and becomes a market-dominant force,
continuing market imperfections and increasing returns to scale may
result in the entrenchment of market dominance and the exclusion of
others. In such cases, even if practices such as exclusive dealings and
vertical restraints may have efficiency and consumer welfare
justifications under market conditions such as those that exist in the
Untied States, they may not under market conditions of many
developing countries. These countries may promote competition and
increase efficiency by using antitrust to prohibit such practices,
facilitating entry by new competitors who may be members of the non
market-dominant group. In other cases, even if such practices do have
efficiency and consumer-welfare benefits - imagine an efficient
monopolist - developing countries may nonetheless decide to
prohibit them because of overriding social and other non-economic
concerns. In either event, state action would be articulated in non
ethnic terms.
There is admittedly the danger that antitrust would be used as a
pretext to oppress ethnic minorities, with the state seeking to find
"abusive" conduct by "dominant" firms that also "happen" to be

302. Id. at 352, 358-59.
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owned by minority firms.303 And of course, even without malicious
intent, to the extent that the market-dominant ethnic minority does in
fact have market dominance, enforcement of antitrust will have a
disparate impact on ethnic-minority firms.304
Yet, even if the state embarks on an antitrust solution not to
enhance efficiency or consumer welfare, but rather to deal with ethnic
market dominance, there is a difference between blatant state
sponsorship of discrimination against ethnic minorities, proclaimed in
ethnic terms, and an economically based policy to ensure the
efficiency and competitiveness of markets through the adoption of a
law that many countries in the world have already enacted. The first
approach involves the state making note of, perpetuating, and
entrenching ethnic differences and in the process, representing one
ethnic group as outsiders and another as insiders. The second
approach casts the issue as a market problem to be dealt with by
economic, not ethnic, policies. All companies, regardless of the
ethnicity of the owners, would be subject to the law, and to the extent
that small-business promotion is also one of the state's objectives, all
small businesses would be granted the same opportunity to compete
for access to capital or credit.
Even if the result is the same - deconcentration of ethnic
conglomerates - the difference in tone is important because, as some
have cautioned, policymakers should be aware of the "full range of
consequences of their decisions."305 When governments act and make
distinctions based on ethnicity in ways that harm people solely
because they are members of a certain ethnic group, particularly
politically vulnerable minority ethnic groups,306 such actions show
deliberate intent to include some and exclude others and thus involve
the government in the violation of "baseline norms of reciprocity" and

303. Kovacic, supra note 254, at 288; Equity Rather than Ethnicity, supra note 274.
304. Michael Shari & Jonathan Moore, The Plight of the Ethnic Chinese, B us. WEEK,
Aug. 3, 1998, at 26 (describing how an antitrust law would result in the breakup of Chinese
owned conglomerates because the ethnic Chinese control forty-three of Indonesia's top fifty
listed conglomerates).
305. Pildes, supra note 196, at 2058 (arguing in favor of government compensation to
private individuals when government inflicts harm on them). Professor Pildes rejects the
counterargument that private individuals should bear the loss themselves, as they do when
the harm is due to an act of God. Id. at 2070.
306. The vulnerability of the Chinese in Indonesia, for example, has been widely noted.
See, e.g. p. 45; Shari & Moore, supra note 304; Sipress, supra note 276, at A18. Sipress
describes how the ethnic Chinese were barred from the senior ranks of government and their
numbers limited at universities, causing many to turn to entrepreneurship. Discrimination
continues as the ethnic Chinese are still described on their birth certificates as "foreign
Orientals," and must apply for a certificate stating that their parents were Indonesian
citizens because such a certificate is required to obtain a passport, business license or
university admission. Id.
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fair dealing.307 To inflict such "demoralization costs"308 on an ethnic
minority is wrong and unnecessary, particularly when there are other
avenues available to accomplish more or less the same objective.
Essentially, then, the proposals set forth by Professor Chua in her
book and those presented in this Review as alternatives represent
competing views of ethnicity, markets, and legitimate state action. As
the editor of the Jakarta Post puts it in cautioning against the adoption
of ethnically biased governmental actions to address minority market
dominance, " [a] law that favors one ethnic group or discriminates
against certain ethnic groups will be the first step toward
institutionalizing discrimination practices . . . . Such a law in Indonesia
would only strengthen ethnic divisions and would take us further away
from our goal of national integration."309

307. Pildes, supra note 196, at 2070.
308. Id. (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethnical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1 165, 1214 (1967)).
309. Own Up to Ethnic Problem, supra note 275.

